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THE DARK SIDE OF THE FORCE: THE LEGACY OF JUSTICE
HOLMES FOR FIRST AMENDMENT JURISPRUDENCE

Steven J. Heyman*

ABSTRACT
Modern First Amendment jurisprudence is deeply paradoxical. On one hand,
freedom of speech is said to promote fundamental values such as individual selffulfillment, democratic deliberation, and the search for truth. At the same time, however, many leading decisions protect speech that appears to undermine these values
by attacking the dignity and personality of others or their status as full and equal
members of the community. In this Article, I explore where this Jekyll-and-Hyde
quality of First Amendment jurisprudence comes from. I argue that the American free
speech tradition consists of two very different strands: a liberal humanist view that emphasizes the positive values promoted by free speech, and a darker vision that is rooted
in the jurisprudence of Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes. Holmes understands free
speech as part of a struggle for power between different social groups—a struggle that
ultimately can be resolved only by force. After sketching the liberal humanist view,
I trace the development of Holmes’s position, which is grounded in his Darwinian
understanding of human life and in his deeper view that all phenomena in the universe
are governed by force. Next, I evaluate the Holmesian approach and discuss its implications for a wide range of contemporary issues, from hate speech and pornography
to the Citizens United decision on electoral advertising by corporations. I conclude
that Holmes’s view does not provide an adequate rationale for free speech, and that
it undermines the liberal humanist principles that should be regarded as central to the
First Amendment.

* Professor of Law, Chicago-Kent College of Law. A.B. 1979, J.D. 1984, Harvard. For
thoughtful comments, I am grateful to Kate Baldwin, Katharine Baker, Harry Clor, Jacob
Corré, Andrew Koppelman, and Mark Rosen, as well as the participants in faculty workshops
at Chicago-Kent and Northwestern University law schools and a panel at the 2010 Annual
Meeting of the Law and Society Association. Margaux Birdsall, Michael Young, and Jessie
Augustyn provided outstanding research assistance.
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The constitutional right of free expression . . . is designed and
intended to remove governmental restraints from the arena of public
discussion, putting the decision as to what views shall be voiced
largely into the hands of each of us, in the hope that use of such
freedom will ultimately produce a more capable citizenry and more
perfect polity and in the belief that no other approach would comport
with the premise of individual dignity and choice upon which our
political system rests.
—Justice John Marshall Harlan1
1

Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 24 (1971).
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If in the long run the beliefs expressed in proletarian dictatorship are
destined to be accepted by the dominant forces of the community, the
only meaning of free speech is that they should be given their chance
and have their way.
—Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes2
INTRODUCTION
The right to free expression is central to our constitutional order.3 Yet there is
something deeply paradoxical about modern First Amendment jurisprudence. On one
hand, freedom of speech is said to promote fundamental values such as individual selffulfillment, democratic deliberation, and the search for truth. These values are vindicated in leading decisions like West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette4
and New York Times Co. v. Sullivan.5 At the same time, however, many important
cases extend constitutional protection to expression that appears to undermine those
values, such as racist hate speech,6 violent and degrading pornography,7 and gross
invasions of privacy.8 In this way, our free speech jurisprudence seems highly conflicted: in some cases, courts interpret the First Amendment to promote its core values,
while in others they insist that speech is entitled to protection despite the harm that it
may cause to those values.
In response, some people would say that this paradox is illusory. Some scholars
who take a deontological approach to the First Amendment assert that the state must
respect an individual’s right to speak even when it causes serious harm.9 Similarly,
some of those who take a more interest-oriented approach argue that the values that
2

Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 673 (1925) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
The First Amendment provides, “Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment
of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of
the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for
a redress of grievances.” U.S. CONST. amend. I.
4
319 U.S. 624 (1943) (holding that individuals cannot be compelled to salute the
American flag).
5
376 U.S. 254 (1964) (holding that the First Amendment protects all good-faith criticism
of the official conduct of public officials).
6
See, e.g., R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377 (1992) (striking down an ordinance
banning cross-burning); Collin v. Smith, 578 F.2d 1197 (7th Cir. 1978) (holding that a neoNazi group had a First Amendment right to march in a Jewish neighborhood), cert. denied, 439
U.S. 916 (1978).
7
See, e.g., Am. Booksellers Ass’n v. Hudnut, 771 F.2d 323 (7th Cir. 1985) (striking down
an ordinance that restricted pornography on the grounds that it violated women’s civil rights),
aff’d mem., 475 U.S. 1001 (1986).
8
See, e.g., Florida Star v. B.J.F., 491 U.S. 524 (1989) (holding that a newspaper had a
First Amendment right to publish the name of a rape victim).
9
See, e.g., C. EDWIN BAKER, HUMAN LIBERTY AND FREEDOM OF SPEECH 55 (1989)
[hereinafter BAKER, HUMAN LIBERTY]; C. Edwin Baker, Harm, Liberty, and Free Speech,
70 S. CAL. L. REV. 979, 989–92 (1997) [hereinafter Baker, Harm].
3
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are promoted by free speech categorically outweigh those on the other side.10 On both
of these views, the harm that flows from particular forms of expression is simply the
price that we pay for a free society. In my judgment, however, the paradox of First
Amendment jurisprudence cannot be dismissed so easily. When speech invades the
dignity or privacy of other people or attacks their status as human beings and citizens,
it injures interests “of the highest order.”11 Indeed, as I shall show, these interests derive from the same principles that justify freedom of speech itself, such as individual
self-realization and democratic community.12 For these reasons, it is not clear that the
First Amendment should always be interpreted to protect speech that causes serious
injury to others.
In short, First Amendment jurisprudence has a certain Jekyll-and-Hyde quality.
The purpose of this Article is to explore where this quality comes from. I shall argue
that the American free speech tradition actually consists of two very different strands.
One is a liberal humanist view that emphasizes the positive values that are promoted
by freedom of speech.13 The other is a darker vision that is rooted in the jurisprudence
of Justice Holmes. Holmes rejects the values of human freedom and dignity on which
the liberal humanist view rests. Instead, he holds that free speech is best understood
as part of the struggle for power between different social groups—a struggle that
ultimately can be resolved only by force.14
In Part I of this Article, I provide an overview of the liberal humanist approach
to the First Amendment—an approach that I have described and defended in depth
elsewhere.15 The next two parts contrast this view with that of Holmes. In Part II,
I discuss his early, restrictive approach to free speech in cases like Schenck v. United
States,16 in which he took the position that speech could be restricted whenever it
10

See, e.g., United States v. Stevens, 130 S. Ct. 1577, 1585 (2010) (“The First Amendment . . . reflects a judgment by the American people that the benefits of its restrictions on
the Government outweigh the costs. Our Constitution forecloses any attempt to revise that
judgment simply on the basis that some speech is not worth it.”); Konigsberg v. State Bar of
Cal., 366 U.S. 36, 61 (1961) (Black, J., dissenting) (“[T]he First Amendment’s unequivocal
command . . . shows that the men who drafted our Bill of Rights did all the ‘balancing’ that was
to be done in this field.”); ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, POLITICAL FREEDOM 57 (1960) (The
First Amendment expresses the view “that freedom is always expedient.”).
11
Florida Star, 491 U.S. at 537 (acknowledging that ensuring the privacy of rape victims
is an “interest of the highest order”) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
12
See infra Part IV.C.
13
In this Article, I use the term “liberal” to refer not to a current political orientation, but
rather to the American tradition of individual liberty and democratic self-government that runs
from the colonial era to the present—a tradition that embraces contemporary progressives,
conservatives, and libertarians as well as liberals.
14
While in some areas this view would protect more speech than the liberal humanist
view, in others it would protect less speech. See infra Part V.B–C.
15
See STEVEN J. HEYMAN, FREE SPEECH AND HUMAN DIGNITY (2008) [hereinafter
HEYMAN, FREE SPEECH].
16
249 U.S. 47 (1919).
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endangered other social interests.17 In Part III, I explore his later approach in Abrams
v. United States18 and Gitlow v. New York.19 In those cases, Holmes contended that
free speech was necessary so that society could arrive at the truth—a truth that he
equated with the ideas that would emerge from “the competition of the market,”20 and
ultimately with the beliefs that would be “accepted by the dominant forces of the
community.”21 Finally, in Parts IV and V, I evaluate the Holmesian view and discuss
its implications for a wide range of current First Amendment problems, including
pornography, invasion of privacy, hate speech, corporate electoral advertising, private
and artistic expression, and speech by public employees. I conclude that Holmes’s
view does not provide an adequate rationale for free speech and that it undermines the
liberal humanist values that provide a much stronger justification. For these reasons,
I argue that First Amendment jurisprudence should move away from the Holmesian
view and more fully embrace the liberal humanist position.
I. THE LIBERAL HUMANIST APPROACH TO FREE EXPRESSION
A. Liberal Humanism and the Natural Rights Tradition
The origins of the liberal humanist strand of First Amendment jurisprudence
may be found in the theory of natural rights and the social contract that was widely
accepted in eighteenth-century England and America.22 This view provided the
theoretical basis for the Declaration of Independence, the first state constitutions, the
federal Constitution, and the Bill of Rights, as well as the intellectual framework for
leading legal texts such as Sir William Blackstone’s Commentaries on the Laws of
England and Chancellor James Kent’s Commentaries on American Law.23 A brief
review of natural rights theory will provide valuable background not only for understanding the modern liberal humanist approach to the First Amendment, but also for
understanding Holmes’s legal philosophy, which was defined in opposition to
traditional conceptions of natural rights.
Natural rights theory is based on the idea of self-determination.24 In contrast to
inanimate objects, whose motions are determined by the laws of physics, human beings
17

Id. at 52.
250 U.S. 616 (1919).
19
268 U.S. 652 (1925).
20
Abrams, 250 U.S. at 630 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
21
Gitlow, 268 U.S. at 673 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
22
A more comprehensive account of this history may be found in HEYMAN, FREE SPEECH,
supra note 15, at 7–22.
23
WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND (St. George Tucker
ed., Phila., Birch & Small 1803); JAMES KENT, COMMENTARIES ON AMERICAN LAW.
24
See RICHARD PRICE, OBSERVATIONS ON THE NATURE OF CIVIL LIBERTY (5th ed. 1776),
reprinted in POLITICAL WRITINGS 20, 22 (D.O. Thomas ed., 1991).
18
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are capable of thinking for themselves and of determining their actions in accord with
reason.25 This capacity is the foundation of the natural liberty of mankind, which
consists in the power to control one’s own person, to direct one’s own actions, and to
acquire, possess, and dispose of external things.26 These are the classic natural rights
of life, liberty, and property.27
Reason not only provides the basis for natural liberty but also prescribes its limits.
Because all individuals are equally free, the law of nature and reason teaches that no
one should deprive another of his rights.28 In a state of nature, however, individual
rights would be radically insecure because there would be no effective means of defending them against aggressors who had superior force.29
For the natural rights tradition, the solution to this problem lies in the social contract. Through this agreement, individuals undertake to form a community and to invest
it with the power to make and enforce laws for the protection of their rights against invasion by others.30 On this view, law has an important moral dimension, for it is concerned with the protection of rights and the prevention or punishment of wrongs.31
In addition to explaining the nature of law and government, natural rights theory
provides an account of fundamental rights. When individuals enter into society, they
alienate a portion of their natural liberty in return for the protection they receive from
the community.32 At the same time, they retain other aspects of their liberty, which
are inalienable.33 The difference between these two forms of liberty can best be understood in terms of a distinction between the internal and the external. External interaction can bring individuals into conflict with one another. Thus, two persons may
both claim the same property, or one of them may demand compensation for an injury
allegedly caused by the other. In a state of nature, disputes of this sort ultimately can
be resolved only by force and violence.34 It is precisely to avoid this condition that
25

See JOHN LOCKE, AN ESSAY CONCERNING HUMAN UNDERSTANDING bk. II, ch. XXI,
§§ 4–13, at 234–40 (Peter H. Nidditch ed., Clarendon Press 1975) (1700) [hereinafter LOCKE,
HUMAN UNDERSTANDING].
26
See id., §§ 51–52, at 266–67; JOHN LOCKE, TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT bk. II,
§ 4, at 269 (Peter Laslett ed., Cambridge Univ. Press 1988) (1698) [hereinafter LOCKE,
GOVERNMENT]; 1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 23, at *125, *129–40.
27
See LOCKE, GOVERNMENT, supra note 26, bk. II, § 123, at 350; 1 BLACKSTONE, supra
note 23, at *129–40; 2 KENT, supra note 23, at *1–37.
28
See LOCKE, GOVERNMENT, supra note 26, bk. II, § 6, at 270–71.
29
Id., §§ 123–27, at 350-52; 1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 23, at *125.
30
LOCKE, GOVERNMENT, supra note 26, bk. II, §§ 87–89, 127–31, at 323–25, 352–53.
31
1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 23, at *122. As Blackstone explains, the law of torts is
concerned with private wrongs or those against individuals, while criminal law is concerned
with public wrongs or those against the community. Id.
32
See LOCKE, GOVERNMENT, supra note 26, bk. II, §§ 128–31, at 352–53; 1 BLACKSTONE,
supra note 23, at *125.
33
See, e.g., LOCKE, GOVERNMENT, supra note 26, bk. II, § 131, at 353.
34
See id., § 125, at 351.
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civil society is formed.35 When individuals enter into the social contract, they give up
the unrestrained power to act as they see fit, as well as the power to determine whether
others have violated their rights.36 These powers are transferred to the political community, which is vested with the authority to make laws regulating the liberty and property
of its members and to resolve disputes about these matters.37 In this way, rights come
to be determined and disputes to be resolved not by force but by the reasoned judgment of the community, or of the governing bodies that it has established.38
For the natural rights tradition, then, the proper role of law and government is
confined to the realm of external interaction between individuals.39 By contrast, other
matters fall within the sphere of internal freedom. On this view, there is a realm of
purely private conduct that is beyond the legitimate authority of the state.40 And this
is even more true of the realm of thought and belief.41 At the deepest level, thought
is constitutive of individual personality: the consciousness of one’s self over time, the
ability to determine one’s actions, and the capacity to be responsible for them are what
make one a person.42 Moreover, the thoughts and beliefs that an individual holds cause
no external injury to others.43 For these reasons, freedom of thought and belief are inalienable rights.44 Although the state must be able to use force to implement the laws
and to adjudicate external disputes, coercion is wholly out of place in the internal realm
of thought and belief, which cannot be determined by force but only by reason.45
The right to freedom of speech rests on a similar basis. Although speech involves
interaction with others, this is essentially different than the sort of interaction that
35

See id. § 127, at 352.
See id., §§ 87–89, 128–30, at 323–25, 352–53.
37
See id.
38
See id., §§ 87–89, at 323–25.
39
See JOHN LOCKE, A LETTER CONCERNING TOLERATION, in A LETTER CONCERNING
TOLERATION AND OTHER WRITINGS 12–13 (Mark Goldie ed., Liberty Fund 2010) (1690)
[hereinafter LOCKE, TOLERATION].
40
See 1 JOHN TRENCHARD & THOMAS GORDON, CATO’S LETTERS 428 (Ronald Hamowy
ed., Liberty Fund 1995) (1755) [hereinafter CATO’S LETTERS] (Letter No. 62, Jan. 20, 1721);
1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 23, at *123–24.
41
See, e.g., LOCKE, TOLERATION, supra note 39, at 12–14; 1 CATO’S LETTERS, supra note
40, at 428 (Letter No. 62, Jan. 20, 1721).
42
See LOCKE, HUMAN UNDERSTANDING, supra note 25, bk. II, ch. XXVII, §§ 9, 26, at
335, 346–47.
43
See LOCKE, TOLERATION, supra note 39, at 45–46. As Thomas Jefferson puts it, “[I]t
does me no injury for my neighbor to say there are twenty gods, or no god. It neither picks my
pocket nor breaks my leg.” THOMAS JEFFERSON, Notes on the State of Virginia query XVII
(1787), reprinted in WRITINGS 123, 285 (Merrill D. Peterson ed., Library of Am. 1984).
44
See LOCKE, HUMAN UNDERSTANDING, supra note 25, bk. II, ch. XXI, § 10, at 353;
LOCKE, TOLERATION, supra note 39, at 13; James Madison, Memorial and Remonstrance
Against Religious Assessments ¶ 1 (1785), reprinted in 5 THE FOUNDERS’ CONSTITUTION 82,
82 (Philip B. Kurland & Ralph Lerner eds., 1987).
45
See LOCKE, TOLERATION, supra note 39, at 12–13; VA. DECLARATION OF RIGHTS of
1776, art. XVI.
36
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requires regulation by the law of the state. The function of speech is to communicate ideas from one mind to another.46 In this way, speech has the same inward
quality as thought. It follows that, as a general matter, law and force are out of place
here as well.47
In addition to being inalienable rights of individuals, freedom of speech and
thought have an important political function. According to the natural rights tradition, all political power originally belongs to the people.48 But the business of law
and government cannot be effectively transacted by the community as a whole. For
this reason, the community institutes a government and entrusts it with the power to
make and enforce laws.49 Yet the community always retains the power to oversee the
ways in which the government uses this authority.50 Moreover, if the people are wise,
they will delegate power only for limited periods of time and only to persons whom
they elect. Freedom of speech and press are key means by which the people oversee
the conduct of public affairs and exercise their power within an elective system of
government.51 This is what Americans of the founding generation meant when they
declared that those freedoms were “essential to the security of freedom in a state.”52
For the natural rights tradition, people are entitled to liberty of speech, thought,
and belief not only as private individuals and republican citizens, but also as intellectual and spiritual beings whose happiness both in this world and the next depends on
their ability to inquire into and follow truth.53 Accordingly, late eighteenth-century
Americans conceived of these freedoms in broad terms.54 As the Jeffersonian jurist
St. George Tucker put it, liberty of speech encompassed
the . . . right of speaking, writing, and publishing, our opinions
concerning any subject, whether religious, philosophical, or political; and of inquiring into and . . . examining the nature of truth,
whether moral or metaphysical; the expediency or inexpediency
of all public measures, with their tendency and probable effect;
46

See LOCKE, HUMAN UNDERSTANDING, supra note 25, bk. III, ch. I, § 2, at 402; id. ch. II,
§§ 1–2, at 404–05; St. George Tucker, Of the Right of Conscience; and of the Freedom of
Speech and of the Press, in 1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 23, app., note G, at 11.
47
As I shall explain, however, some acts of speech violate the rights of others, and in such
cases the law properly can intervene. See infra text accompanying notes 55–58.
48
See, e.g., LOCKE, GOVERNMENT, supra note 26, bk. II, §§ 87–89, 127–32, at 323–35,
352–54; PENN. CONST. of 1776, art. IV.
49
LOCKE, GOVERNMENT, supra note 26, bk. II, §§ 132, 134, at 354–55.
50
Id., §§ 149, 240, at 366–67, 426–27.
51
See, e.g., 1 CATO’S LETTERS, supra note 40, at 111 (Letter No. 15, Feb. 4, 1720);
James Madison, Report on the Virginia Resolutions (1800), reprinted in 5 THE FOUNDERS’
CONSTITUTION, supra note 44, at 141, 144–46.
52
MASS. CONST. of 1780, pt. 1, art. XVI.
53
See, e.g., LOCKE, TOLERATION, supra note 39, at 13–16, 44–48.
54
See, e.g., Tucker, supra note 46, at 11.
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the conduct of public men, and generally every other subject,
without restraint, except as to the injury of any other individual,
in his person, property, or good name.55
As this passage indicates, however, the natural rights tradition did not regard
freedom of speech as an absolute. Although speech may be described as internal in
the sense that it communicates thoughts from one mind to another, it is also capable
of causing the kinds of harm that are properly the concern of the state. For example,
threats and incitement can invade an individual’s right to personal security, while
defamation can wrongfully injure her right to reputation.56 Even strong libertarians
and republicans like Tucker believed that in such cases the law could properly restrict
speech to protect the rights of others.57 Blackstonian conservatives went further and
held that, like other forms of liberty, freedom of speech and press were also subject to
regulation to promote the public good.58 Both of these views had many adherents in
eighteenth and nineteenth century America.59
B. Liberal Humanism in Contemporary First Amendment Jurisprudence
The natural rights tradition had a strong influence not only on the adoption of the
Bill of Rights, but also on the enactment of the Fourteenth Amendment—the provision
that has made the Bill of Rights applicable to the states.60 In the decades after the
Civil War, natural rights thought increasingly fell into disfavor.61 Over the past halfcentury, however, the idea of fundamental rights has undergone a substantial revival,
55

Id. A similarly broad view can be found in a well-known statement by the First
Continental Congress in 1774, which declared that
[t]he importance of [the freedom of the press] consists, besides the
advancement of truth, science, morality, and arts in general, in its diffusion of liberal sentiments on the administration of Government, its ready
communication of thoughts between subjects, and its consequential promotion of union among them, whereby oppressive officers are shamed or
intimidated, into more honourable and just modes of conducting affairs.
Letter from the Continental Congress to the Inhabitants of the Province of Quebec (Oct. 26,
1774), reprinted in NEIL H. COGAN, CONTEXTS OF THE CONSTITUTION 693, 695 (1999).
56
See, e.g., 3 BLACKSTONE, supra note 23, at *120 (discussing threats); id. at *123–26
(discussing defamation).
57
See, e.g., Tucker, supra note 46, at 11, 28–30; HEYMAN, FREE SPEECH, supra note 15,
at 9, 12, 19.
58
See 4 BLACKSTONE, supra note 23, at *151–52; HEYMAN, FREE SPEECH, supra note
15, at 9–11.
59
See HEYMAN, FREE SPEECH, supra note 15, at 9, 12, 19.
60
See id. at 20–22 & 216 n.58.
61
See, e.g., MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW, 1870–1960,
at 116, 138–39, 153–59, 204–05 (1992).

670

WILLIAM & MARY BILL OF RIGHTS JOURNAL

[Vol. 19:661

not only in the First Amendment area but also in other areas of constitutional law62 and
political thought.63 Although we no longer speak in terms of “natural rights,” the main
outlines of the classical view are still recognizable in the liberal humanist strand of
contemporary First Amendment jurisprudence.
First, like the classical view, contemporary jurisprudence regards freedom of
speech and thought as aspects of individual liberty. At the heart of this liberty is “a
right of self-determination in matters that touch individual opinion and personal attitude.”64 That right means, to begin with, that the government may not use its power
to intrude into the inner realm of thought and belief. The leading case is West Virginia
State Board of Education v. Barnette,65 in which the Supreme Court declared that the
efforts of local authorities to compel school children to salute the American flag in
violation of their religious beliefs “transcends constitutional limitations on [the government’s] power and invades the sphere of intellect and spirit which it is the purpose
of the First Amendment to our Constitution to reserve from all official control.”66
In addition to safeguarding the inner lives of individuals, the First Amendment
protects the positive right to form and express one’s own thoughts and feelings. As
Thomas I. Emerson puts it:
The right to freedom of expression . . . derives from the widely
accepted premise of Western thought that the proper end of man
is the realization of his character and potentialities as a human
being. Man is distinguished from other animals principally by
the qualities of his mind. He has powers to reason and to feel in
ways that are unique in degree if not in kind. He has the capacity
to think in abstract terms, to use language, to communicate his
thoughts and emotions, to build a culture. He has powers of imagination, insight and feeling. It is through development of these
powers that man finds his meaning and his place in the world.67
62

See, e.g., Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (recognizing a constitutional
right to privacy that includes the use of contraception); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973)
(holding that the right to privacy extends to abortion); Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey,
505 U.S. 833 (1992) (reaffirming the basic holding of Roe); Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558
(2003) (striking down antisodomy laws under the Fourteenth Amendment); McDonald v. City
of Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 3020 (2010) (holding that the Second Amendment right to keep and bear
arms is a fundamental right that applies to the states).
63
See, e.g., ROBERT NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA (1974); JOHN RAWLS, A
THEORY OF JUSTICE (rev. ed. 1999).
64
W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 631 (1943).
65
Id.
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Id. at 642.
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Thomas I. Emerson, Toward a General Theory of the First Amendment, 72 YALE L.J.
877, 879 (1963) [hereinafter Emerson, General Theory].
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For Emerson, it follows that individuals have a right to engage in self-expression, and
that a denial of this right is “an affront to the dignity of man” and “a negation of man’s
essential nature.”68
A second contemporary justification for the First Amendment focuses not on individual liberty but on the requirements of democratic self-government. This view finds
classic expression in the writings of Alexander Meiklejohn.69 For Meiklejohn, citizens
must be able to speak freely on matters of public concern so that all relevant views may
be heard.70 Only in this way can the polity reach wise and fully informed decisions
on public issues.71 The First Amendment is designed to prevent the “mutilation of the
thinking process of the community” that results when government censors expression
that it considers “false or dangerous.”72
Meiklejohn’s view is sometimes said to be an instrumentalist one, which seeks to
protect free speech simply as a means to informed decision-making.73 But in fact the
basis of his view lies deeper. According to Meiklejohn, “Whether it be in the field of
individual or of social activity, men are not recognizable as men unless, in any given
situation, they are using their minds to give direction to their behavior.”74 In this way
his argument for free speech is connected with a conception of human nature and
dignity—“the dignity of men who govern themselves.”75 Democracy is possible only
on the basis of an “attitude of mutual regard” among free and equal individuals who
68

Id. For some other leading statements of the individual liberty rationale, see BAKER,
HUMAN LIBERTY, supra note 9; MARTIN H. REDISH, FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION: A CRITICAL
ANALYSIS 9-86 (1984); DAVID A. J. RICHARDS, TOLERATION AND THE CONSTITUTION 165–227
(1986); Thomas Scanlon, A Theory of Freedom of Expression, 1 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 204 (1972).
In recent years, Vincent Blasi has advanced a related rationale: that expressive liberty should
be protected because it tends to promote courage, independence, open-mindedness, and other
character traits that make a valuable contribution to social and political well-being in modern
society. See, e.g., Vincent Blasi, Free Speech and Good Character: From Milton to Brandeis
to the Present, in ETERNALLY VIGILANT : FREE SPEECH IN THE MODERN ERA 61 (Lee C.
Bollinger & Geoffrey R. Stone eds., 2002). This essay is reprinted in Ideas of the First
Amendment, a casebook which contains a wealth of material on liberal-humanist and other
theories of free expression. VINCENT BLASI, IDEAS OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT 929 (2006).
69
See, e.g., MEIKLEJOHN, POLITICAL FREEDOM, supra note 10; Alexander Meiklejohn, The
First Amendment is an Absolute, 1961 SUP. CT. REV. 245 (1961) [hereinafter Meiklejohn,
Absolute]. Other important statements of this view include JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND
DISTRUST 105–16 (1980); OWEN M. FISS, THE IRONY OF FREE SPEECH (1996); ROBERT C.
POST, CONSTITUTIONAL DOMAINS (1995); CASS R. SUNSTEIN, DEMOCRACY AND THE PROBLEM
OF FREE SPEECH (1993).
70
MEIKLEJOHN, POLITICAL FREEDOM, supra note 10, at 24–28.
71
Id. at 26–28.
72
Id. at 27.
73
See, e.g., LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 12-1, at 785–87
(2d ed. 1988).
74
MEIKLEJOHN, POLITICAL FREEDOM, supra note 10, at 13.
75
Id. at 68.
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“have succeeded in binding themselves together into a fellowship” that is committed
to being a self-governing community.76
A third rationale holds that freedom of speech and thought are essential to the
“search for truth”—an argument that is most fully developed in John Stuart Mill’s
essay On Liberty.77 Mill asserts that, “on every subject on which difference of opinion
is possible,” one can determine the truth only by considering competing views.78 This
is true even in the natural sciences, in which alternative explanations of the same phenomenon can always be advanced.79 And it is especially true in the areas of “morals,
religion, politics, [and] social relations.”80 The truth about human well-being is inherently complex and multisided: it can be apprehended only through an effort to reconcile
opposing values such as wealth and equality, cooperation and competition, sociality
and individuality, and liberty and order.81 Accordingly, Mill argues that
the only way in which . . . human being[s] can make some approach to knowing the whole of a subject, is by hearing what can
be said about it by persons of every variety of opinion, and studying all modes in which it can be looked at by every character of
mind.82
In this way, Mill believes that free speech is required for the discovery of truth
on matters of deep concern to human beings.83 It would be a mistake, however, to
conclude that Mill values free speech only for the objective truths that it may reveal.
Instead, he believes that it is no less valuable for the impact that it has on the minds
and characters of those who engage in it. In On Liberty, he maintains that “the end of
man . . . is the highest and most harmonious development of his powers to a complete
and consistent whole.”84 By thinking for ourselves and by participating in free and
open discussion with others, we develop our intellectual faculties and in this way
attain “the dignity of thinking beings.”85 Moreover, no matter how valid a particular
belief may be, “if it is not fully, frequently, and fearlessly discussed,” it will tend to
degenerate into “a dead dogma” rather than a “living truth.”86 Thus, free discussion
is necessary so that individuals may come to have a “lively apprehension” of the
76

Id. at 69–70.
JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY 27 (David Spitz ed., W.W. Norton 1975) (1859).
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Id. at 36.
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Id.
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Id.
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Id. at 46.
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Id. at 21.
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Id. at 28.
84
Id. at 54 (quoting and translating WILHELM VON HUMBOLDT, THE SPHERE AND DUTIES
OF GOVERNMENT 11–13 (1851)).
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Id. at 34.
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Id. at 34–35.
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meaning of the beliefs that they profess, and so that those beliefs may have a real
effect on their feelings and conduct.87 In all of these ways, liberty of thought and
discussion are vital not only for the “intellectual” but also for the “moral” “wellbeing of mankind.”88
In short, the contemporary liberal humanist view, like the classical view, holds
that freedom of speech and thought are justified because of their relation to individual
liberty, democratic self-government, and the search for truth. Although it is sometimes
said that these rationales are opposed to one another,89 they are more commonly regarded as mutually reinforcing elements of a unified theory of free expression.90 One
of the most eloquent expressions of this view can be found in the quotation from Justice
Harlan’s opinion in Cohen v. California91 that forms the first epigraph to this Article.
II. HOLMES’S EARLY FREE SPEECH JURISPRUDENCE
In many ways, Holmes’s approach to law and freedom of expression is diametrically opposed to the liberal humanist theory that I have just outlined. In this Part, I
explore his general views on law as well as his early views on free speech, as expressed
in opinions like Schenck v. United States92 and Debs v. United States.93 These views
provide essential background for understanding his later First Amendment jurisprudence, which is the subject of Part III.94
A. Holmes’s Philosophy of Law
Holmes’s disagreement with liberal humanism went to the very root of that view:
the idea that we are free beings who have a capacity for self-determination.95 As a
determinist, Holmes denied the idea of free will,96 and instead held that human action
87

Id. at 38–40; see also id. at 43, 50–51.
Id. at 38, 50.
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For example, Meiklejohn insists that the First Amendment is concerned only with democracy, not with individual self-expression. See MEIKLEJOHN, POLITICAL FREEDOM, supra note
10, at 54–56.
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See, e.g., THOMAS I. EMERSON, THE SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION 6–7 (1970)
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403 U.S. 15 (1971).
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249 U.S. 47 (1919).
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249 U.S. 211 (1919).
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For an excellent collection of materials on Holmes and the First Amendment, see THE
FUNDAMENTAL HOLMES: A FREE SPEECH CHRONICLE AND READER (Ronald K.L. Collins ed.,
2010).
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See, e.g., Letter from Oliver Wendell Holmes to Frederick Pollock (Aug. 30, 1929), in
2 HOLMES-POLLOCK LETTERS 251, 252 (Mark DeWolfe Howe ed., 1941).
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See, e.g., id.; see also H.L. POHLMAN, JUSTICE OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES & UTILITARIAN
JURISPRUDENCE 135 (1984).
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ultimately was produced by the same forces and was subject to the same laws of cause
and effect that governed all other phenomena in the universe.97
In dismissing the ideas of human freedom and self-determination, Holmes also
rejected the principles that were said to flow from them, especially the concept of
natural rights. In a 1918 essay entitled Natural Law, Holmes observed that even “[t]he
most fundamental of the supposed pre[e]xisting rights—the right to life—is sacrificed
without a scruple not only in war, but whenever the interest of society, that is, of the
predominant power in the community, is thought to demand it.”98 Likewise, he poured
scorn on the notion of human dignity, as expressed, for example, in the Kantian injunction to treat every person as an end in himself.99 In a 1926 letter to his friend
John C.H. Wu, a legal philosopher in the idealist tradition, Holmes wrote:
I don’t believe that it is an absolute principle or even a human
ultimate that man always is an end in himself—that his dignity
must be respected, etc. We march up a conscript with bayonets
behind to die for a cause he doesn’t believe in. And I feel no
scruples about it. Our morality seems to me only a check on the
ultimate domination of force, just as our politeness is a check on
the impulse of every pig to put his feet in the trough.100
These views led Holmes to develop a fundamentally different conception of law.
As I have noted, the traditional conception of law was based on the idea of human
liberty.101 Actions were understood as expressions of free will.102 Individuals had the
right to do as they chose so long as they did not act wrongfully by violating the laws
of the community, which were made to protect the rights of others and to promote the
common good.103 In this way, law was about rights and wrongs.104
This moral dimension of traditional legal theory was anathema to Holmes, who believed that it only obscured the nature of law.105 Indeed, Holmes sometimes suggested
97

See, e.g., OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, The Path of the Law, in COLLECTED LEGAL
PAPERS 167, 180 (1920) [hereinafter HOLMES, Path]; OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, Ideals and
Doubts, in id. at 303, 305 [hereinafter HOLMES, Ideals and Doubts].
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OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, Natural Law, in COLLECTED LEGAL PAPERS, supra note
97, at 310, 314 [hereinafter HOLMES, Natural Law]. For an insightful discussion of this essay,
see MICHAEL H. HOFFHEIMER, JUSTICE HOLMES AND THE NATURAL LAW 11–14 (1992).
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See, e.g., OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 37–40 (Mark DeWolfe Howe
ed., Belknap Press 1963) (1881) [hereinafter HOLMES, COMMON LAW]; HOLMES, Ideals and
Doubts, supra note 97, at 304.
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FAITH OF JUSTICE HOLMES 431, 431 (Max Lerner ed., 1943) [hereinafter MIND AND FAITH].
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See supra text accompanying notes 24–26.
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that it would be desirable “if every word of moral significance”—such as “rights,”
“duties,” “malice,” “intent,” and so on—“could be banished from the law altogether.”106
By contrast, Holmes adopted what he regarded as a more rigorous approach to
legal analysis, an approach that reflected the tenets of scientific positivism. He
defined an “act” as “a voluntary muscular contraction, and nothing else.”107 On this
view, acts have no inherent moral quality; instead, as he wrote in Aikens v. Wisconsin,108
an act “derives all its character from the consequences which will follow it under the
circumstances in which it was done.”109 Likewise, Holmes understood law in strictly
nonmoral and instrumentalist terms: it consisted of the use of “the public force,”110 and
its goal was to bring about the consequences that were most strongly desired by the
community.111 Rights and duties were not the foundation of law, but were merely the
terms that were used to describe the fact that, for consequentialist reasons, the state
had decided to protect certain interests or to impose certain burdens.112
B. Holmes’s Early Views on Freedom of Speech
Against this background, it is not difficult to understand Holmes’s early views on
the freedom of speech. For Holmes, speaking was simply one form of external action.
An act of speech had no value in itself, but derived all of its value from the consequences that it produced. If those consequences were likely to be harmful, there was
no reason why the speech should be immune from restriction. Instead, “we should
deal with the act of speech as we deal with any other overt act that we don’t like.”113
As Holmes told Judge Learned Hand in the summer of 1918, free speech was no more
sacrosanct than any other form of liberty, such as “freedom from vaccination.”114
106
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This was the reasoning that underlay Holmes’s opinion in Schenck v. United
States,115 the first great modern free speech case.116 Schenck and Baer were Socialist
Party officials who had printed circulars attacking the Conscription Act as well as the
nation’s involvement in World War I, and had mailed those circulars to men who were
subject to the draft.117 The defendants were convicted of conspiring to violate section 3
of the Espionage Act of 1917 by attempting to obstruct the draft.118 They appealed
their convictions to the Supreme Court on the ground that the circulars fell within the
First Amendment freedoms of speech and press.
On March 3, 1919, the Court unanimously rejected this contention.119 After setting
out the facts, Holmes observed that “[o]f course the document would not have been
sent unless it had been intended to have some effect, and we do not see what effect it
could be expected to have upon persons subject to the draft except to influence them
to obstruct the carrying of it out.”120 Turning to the constitutional issue, he wrote:
v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 37 (1905)—a case that Holmes was fond of citing as an illustration of the broad power that majorities should have to enact their own notions of public
policy in spite of any impact this might have on individual liberty. See, e.g., Lochner v. New
York, 198 U.S. 45, 75 (1905) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
115
249 U.S. 47 (1919).
116
Holmes also took a restrictive view in many earlier cases involving expression. See, e.g.,
Burt v. Advertiser Newspaper Co., 28 N.E. 1, 4 (Mass. 1891) (holding that the common law
privilege of fair comment in libel cases does not extend to false statements of fact accusing the
plaintiff of corruption, even if the defendant reasonably believed them to be true); McAuliffe
v. Mayor of New Bedford, 29 N.E. 517, 517 (Mass. 1892) (rejecting free speech claim by a
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petitioner may have a constitutional right to talk politics, but he has no constitutional right to
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454, 462 (1907) (upholding a conviction for criminal contempt for accusing a state court of
unconstitutional conduct, and asserting that the First Amendment was intended only to prevent
previous restraints on speech); Fox v. Washington, 236 U.S. 273, 278 (1915) (rejecting a
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Newspaper Co. v. United States, 247 U.S. 402, 422–26 (1918) (Holmes, J., dissenting) (voting to overturn a contempt conviction for newspaper articles criticizing a federal judge); G.
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(discussing Holmes’s unpublished dissent in Baltzer v. United States, 248 U.S. 593 (1918), in
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We admit that in many places and in ordinary times the defendants
in saying all that was said in the circular would have been within
their constitutional rights. But the character of every act depends
upon the circumstances in which it is done. The most stringent
protection of free speech would not protect a man in falsely shouting fire in a theatre and causing a panic. It does not even protect
a man from an injunction against uttering words that may have all
the effect of force. . . . The question in every case is whether the
words used are used in such circumstances and are of such a
nature as to create a clear and present danger that they will bring
about the substantive evils that Congress has a right to prevent.
It is a question of proximity and degree. When a nation is at war
many things that might be said in time of peace are such a hindrance to its effort that their utterance will not be endured so long
as men fight and that no Court could regard them as protected by
any constitutional right.121
Several points about this reasoning are remarkable. First, Holmes says nothing
whatever about the value of free speech. Instead, he treats speech no differently than
any other act, and asserts that its “character” will “depend[ ] upon the circumstances
in which it is done”—a proposition for which he cites his opinion in Aikens.122
Second, this passage can be read to reflect a deterministic view of action. For
Holmes, the paradigm case is that of the man who “falsely shout[s] fire in a theatre and
caus[es] a panic.”123 When the theatregoers hear the cry of fire, they react in a largely
instinctive way and rush for the exits. Thus, the man’s speech plausibly can be said
to “caus[e]” their actions with little free choice on their part. Holmes seems to regard
the draftees in Schenck in a similar light. He says that the circulars could be “expected
to have [a definite effect] upon persons subject to the draft,” namely, to lead them to
obstruct its implementation.124 In this passage, Holmes does not portray the draftees
as autonomous individuals who are capable of considering the arguments made in the
circulars, or of deciding for themselves whether or not those arguments are persuasive or should lead them to engage in draft resistance. Nor does he consider the possibility that the circulars might lead the recipients to engage in other forms of action,
such as lawful efforts to challenge the validity of the draft or to secure repeal of the
Conscription Act.125
121
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Finally, although Holmes asserts that words lack constitutional protection only
when they “create a clear and present danger that they will bring about the substantive
evils that Congress has a right to prevent,”126 he makes little if any effort to show that
the circulars did create such a danger. This suggests that, as formulated in Schenck, the
“clear and present danger” test was not meant to be a very demanding one.127 Instead,
the opinion appears to allow speech to be restricted whenever it is likely to cause harm
to other social interests.128 In this way, Schenck provides very little protection for
freedom of speech.
This conclusion is reinforced by two other Espionage Act opinions that Holmes
delivered a week after Schenck. In Debs v. United States,129 the Socialist leader and
four-time presidential candidate Eugene V. Debs had been convicted of attempting to
obstruct the draft by means of a speech that he made in June 1918 “at the state convention of the Socialist Party of Ohio, held at a park in Canton, Ohio, on a . . . Sunday
afternoon before a general audience of 1,200 persons.”130 As Holmes observed, “The
main theme of the speech was socialism, its growth, and a prophecy of its ultimate
success.”131 In the course of the speech, Debs also denounced the war, praised comrades who had gone to prison for obstructing the draft, and told his working-class
audience that “you need to know that you are fit for something better than slavery
and cannon fodder.”132 In contrast to the facts of Schenck, the main purpose of Debs’s
speech was not to promote opposition to the draft, and his rhetoric was not specifically
directed toward men who were subject to conscription. Nevertheless, Holmes did
not believe that Debs posed any First Amendment problem that had not already been
“disposed of in Schenck.”133 So long as the jury could reasonably find that “the words
used had as their natural tendency and reasonably probable effect to obstruct the recruiting service”134—a test that Holmes apparently thought equivalent to Schenck’s
“clear and present danger”—and so long as the defendant specifically intended his
words to have that effect, it made no difference that encouraging draft resistance may
have been only an “incidental” purpose of the speech, or that it was “part of a general
program and expressions of a general and conscientious belief.”135 The clear-andpresent-danger test provided no more protection in Frohwerk v. United States,136 a
OF SPEECH IN AMERICA 131 (Jamie Kalven ed., 1988). On one reading, this language simply
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case in which Holmes upheld another Espionage Act conviction for publishing a
series of newspaper articles that denounced conscription and expressed sympathy
with the German cause.137
III. HOLMES’S LATER FREE SPEECH JURISPRUDENCE
A. The Transformation of Holmes’s Views on Free Speech
In October 1919, less than eight months after the decisions in Schenck and Debs,
the Supreme Court heard oral arguments in Abrams v. United States.138 The defendants
were avowed “revolutionists” and “anarchists” who had distributed leaflets warning
that the American government was planning to intervene in Russia to suppress the
Bolshevik revolution.139 The leaflets called on workers to shut down the munitions
factories, which were “producing bullets, bayonets, cannon, to murder not only the
Germans, but also your dearest, best, who are in Russia and are fighting for freedom.”140
The defendants were convicted of several violations of the Espionage Act, including
conspiring to encourage resistance to the United States in the war and conspiring to
advocate the curtailment of things necessary for prosecution of the war.141 Relying on
Schenck, Debs, and Frohwerk, a majority of the Court upheld the convictions in an
opinion by Justice John H. Clarke.142 Remarkably, Holmes wrote a passionate dissent
which was joined by Justice Louis D. Brandeis.143 This opinion marked a watershed
change in Holmes’s views on the First Amendment.
Although the causes of this transformation have always been something of a
mystery, several factors seem to have played a role. First, Holmes apparently felt
a good deal of ambivalence about Debs and the other cases decided in March 1919.
Although he never expressed any misgivings about the reasoning or the results in
those cases,144 he told his friend Harold J. Laski on March 16 that he “greatly
137
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regretted having to write them” and that he was sorry “that the Government pressed
them to a hearing.”145 He added that “[t]he federal judges seem to me . . . to have got
hysterical about the war,” and suggested that the President should issue some pardons
in those cases.146 Holmes’s ambivalence was only heightened by the sharp criticism
that the decisions received from some leading progressives, such as that contained in
a May 1919 article in The New Republic by Ernst Freund of the University of Chicago
Law School.147
Second, over the course of the year, Holmes engaged in conversations and correspondence with several progressive intellectuals including Laski, Hand, and Zechariah
Chafee, Jr., who all urged him to take a broader view of freedom of speech.148 At their
suggestion, Holmes read a number of works on the subject, including John Stuart Mill’s
On Liberty.149 Laski also gave Holmes a copy of a law review article by Chafee that put
forward a rationale for free speech that may have “touched a chord within” Holmes.150
Chafee argued that freedom of speech served to promote “the discovery and spread of
truth on subjects of general concern,” and that this freedom should be subject to restriction only in situations where its value was clearly outweighed by other important
social interests such as national security.151 Moreover, he maintained that this strong
protection could be afforded by a more rigorous interpretation of the “clear and present danger” formula that Holmes had announced in Schenck.152 In Abrams, Holmes
adopted a position much like this.153
The facts and the law in that case may also have contributed to Holmes’s change
of mind. Although they had much in common with those of the earlier cases, there are
at least two critical differences. First, as Holmes read the record, the speech in Abrams
was not intended to interfere with the war against Germany; instead, its aim was to
prevent American military intervention in Russia.154 Evidently Holmes felt that it
was one thing to say that speech was unprotected when it sought to obstruct the
your eyes—that’s the way ‘it’s’ going to be.” Letter from Oliver Wendell Holmes to Harold J.
Laski (Feb. 28, 1919), in id. at 186, 186.
145
Letter from Oliver Wendell Holmes to Harold J. Laski (Mar. 16, 1919), in 1 HOLMESLASKI LETTERS, supra note 113, at 189, 190.
146
Id. at 142–43. Other expressions of Holmes’s ambivalence can be found in his letters to
Pollock on April 5 and 27, see 2 HOLMES-POLLOCK LETTERS, supra note 95, at 7, 11, and in
his letter to Herbert Croly. See infra note 155.
147
Ernst Freund, The Debs Case and Freedom of Speech, THE NEW REPUBLIC, May 3,
1919, at 13.
148
For accounts of these interactions and their influence on Holmes, see POLENBERG, supra
note 138, at 218–28, and WHITE, supra note 116, at 422–30.
149
See POLENBERG, supra note 138, at 224–27; WHITE, supra note 116, at 427, 577 n.125.
150
WHITE, supra note 116, at 427.
151
Zechariah Chafee, Jr., Freedom of Speech in War Time, 32 HARV. L. REV. 932, 956–57
(1919).
152
Id. at 967–69.
153
See Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
154
See id. at 628–29.
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prosecution of a declared war in which soldiers were currently risking their lives, and
quite another thing to say that speech could be punished simply because it opposed
other potential uses of military force.155
Another key difference related to the statutes at issue. In the March 1919 cases,
the defendants had been convicted of conspiring or attempting to violate a provision
of the 1917 Espionage Act that prohibited obstructions of military recruitment.156
Arguably, that statute was directed not at the expression of opinion as such, but rather
at speech or conduct that sought to bring about a concrete form of harm. By contrast,
the defendants in Abrams were prosecuted under the Espionage Act as it had been
amended by the Sedition Act of 1918.157 Much of that statute plainly was directed
against the expression of opinion, including a provision that made it a crime, “when
the United States is at war, [to] willfully utter . . . or publish any disloyal, profane,
scurrilous, or abusive language about the form of government of the United States,”
and another provision that made it a crime to use “any language intended to bring
the form of government of the United States . . . into contempt, scorn, contumely, or
disrepute.”158 The Abrams defendants were convicted of both of these offenses as well
as the other two described above.159 Holmes seems to have reacted differently to
Abrams in part because of his belief that the defendants were “be[ing] made to suffer
not for [obstructing the war against Germany] but for the creed that they avow.”160 In
Frohwerk, he had intimated that the First Amendment “prohibit[s] legislation against
free speech as such,” even though the Amendment allows restrictions on the consequentialist grounds set forth in cases like Schenck.161
155

This point is suggested by Holmes’s remark in Schenck that “[w]hen a nation is at war
many things that might be said in time of peace are such a hindrance to its effort that their
utterance will not be endured so long as men fight.” Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52
(1919). Similarly, in May 1919, he defended his Espionage Act opinions in a private letter that
he wrote to the editor of The New Republic but decided not to send. There Holmes asserted that
the statutory provisions at issue “not only were constitutional but were proper enough while
the war was on. When people are putting out all their energies in battle I don’t think it unreasonable to say we won’t have obstacles intentionally put in the way of raising troops—by
persuasion any more than by force.” Letter from Oliver Wendell Holmes to Herbert Croly
(May 12, 1919), in 1 HOLMES-LASKI LETTERS, supra note 113, at 202, 203-04.
156
Espionage Act of 1917, Pub. L. No. 65-24, § 3, 40 Stat. 219.
157
Pub. L. No. 65-150, 40 Stat. 553 (1918). This statute was repealed shortly after the war
ended. See Act of March 3, 1921, ch. 136, 41 Stat. 1359, 1360.
158
40 Stat. 553 (1918).
159
Abrams, 250 U.S. at 616–17 (Holmes, J., dissenting); see supra text accompanying
note 141.
160
250 U.S. at 629 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
161
Frohwerk v. United States, 249 U.S. 204, 206 (1919). Holmes expressed a similar view
in Fox v. Washington, 236 U.S. 273 (1915). There the defendant had been convicted of violating a state law that made it an offense, inter alia, “to encourage or advocate disrespect for
law.” Id. at 275–76. Holmes upheld the statute on the understanding that it was “confined to
encouraging an actual breach of law,” but suggested that it might be unconstitutional if it were
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Whatever the reasons for his change of mind, Holmes wrote a forceful dissent in
Abrams.162 The first part of the opinion is devoted to a rather technical argument that
the defendants lacked the intent required for conviction under the statute because their
purpose was to prevent interference with the Russian revolution rather than “to cripple
or hinder the United States in the prosecution of the war” with Germany.163 Although
this part of the opinion is not entirely persuasive, it merely forms the prologue to
Holmes’s discussion of the constitutional issue—a discussion that constitutes one
of the most powerful and influential defenses of free speech ever written. The key
passage reads as follows:
Persecution for the expression of opinions seems to me perfectly
logical. If you have no doubt of your premises or your power and
want a certain result with all your heart you naturally express your
wishes in law and sweep away all opposition. To allow opposition
by speech seems to indicate that you think the speech impotent, as
when a man says that he has squared the circle, or that you do not
care whole-heartedly for the result, or that you doubt either your
power or your premises. But when men have realized that time has
upset many fighting faiths, they may come to believe even more
than they believe the very foundations of their own conduct that
the ultimate good desired is better reached by free trade in ideas—
that the best test of truth is the power of the thought to get itself
accepted in the competition of the market, and that truth is the only
ground upon which their wishes safely can be carried out. That
at any rate is the theory of our Constitution. It is an experiment,
as all life is an experiment. Every year if not every day we have
to wager our salvation upon some prophecy based upon imperfect
knowledge. While that experiment is part of our system I think
that we should be eternally vigilant against attempts to check the
expression of opinions that we loathe and believe to be fraught
with death, unless they so imminently threaten immediate interference with the lawful and pressing purposes of the law that an
immediate check is required to save the country.164
This passage is worth exploring in depth, for it is the fullest statement of Holmes’s
later position on the First Amendment.
“construed to prevent publications merely because they tend to produce unfavorable opinions
of a particular statute or of law in general.” Id. at 277.
162
Abrams, 250 U.S. at 624–31 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
163
Id. at 626–29.
164
Id. at 630.
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B. Idealism and the Logic of Persecution
Remarkably, Holmes’s defense of free speech begins by presenting a rationale for
censorship: “Persecution for the expression of opinions seems to me perfectly logical.
If you have no doubt of your premises or your power and want a certain result with all
your heart you naturally express your wishes in law and sweep away all opposition.”165
Although it may seem that Holmes is speaking ironically here, or that this is no more
than a rhetorical flourish, there is good reason to regard this statement as a serious
expression of his own views. The same argument appears repeatedly in his correspondence, and it is quite consistent with the position that he takes in Schenck.166
Holmes’s discussion of censorship can best be understood in relation to his views
on idealism. Although he was an implacable critic of neo-Kantian idealism—a philosophy that sought to derive objective ethical principles from concepts like human
dignity167—Holmes frequently endorsed a different form of idealism, one that was
rooted in the drive to realize one’s own subjective conception of the good. Although
Holmes never articulated this theory in a systematic way, I believe it can be understood as follows. To live is to act. At first, one’s actions are simply means to an end,
namely, one’s own survival. Over time, however, the pursuits that one engages in become “an end in itself,” that is, an “ideal.”168 Accordingly, our actions are directed
not only toward ensuring our own material existence but also toward the realization
165

Id.
See Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 51–53 (1919). Holmes’s censorship theorem
first appears in a letter to Laski in the summer of 1918:
My thesis would be (1) if you are cocksure, and (2) if you want it very
much, and (3) if you have no doubt of your power—you will do what
you believe efficient to bring about what you want—by legislation or
otherwise.
In most matters of belief we are not cocksure—we don’t care very
much—and we are not certain of our power. But in the opposite case we
should deal with the act of speech as we deal with any other overt act that
we don’t like.
Letter from Oliver Wendell Holmes to Harold J. Laski (July 7, 1918), in 1 HOLMES-LASKI
LETTERS, supra note 113, at 160, 160–61. Holmes reiterated this argument to Laski on the
eve of his Abrams dissent and again more than a decade later. See infra text accompanying
notes 258–67.
167
See, e.g., HOLMES, COMMON LAW, supra note 99, at 37–38, 163–67; HOLMES, Ideals
and Doubts, supra note 97, at 303–05; HOLMES, Natural Law, supra note 98, at 312–14;
Letter from Oliver Wendell Holmes to John C.H. Wu (Aug. 26, 1926), in MIND AND FAITH,
supra note 100, at 431, 431–32.
168
Letter from Oliver Wendell Holmes to Morris Cohen (Sept. 6, 1920), in THE ESSENTIAL
HOLMES 105, 105 (Richard A. Posner ed., 1992). As Holmes put it in a speech on the fiftieth
anniversary of his class’s college graduation, “Man is born a predestined idealist, for he is born
to act. To act is to affirm the worth of an end, and to persist in affirming the worth of an end is
to make an ideal.” Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Class of ’61, in 3 THE COLLECTED WORKS OF
JUSTICE HOLMES 504, 504 (Sheldon M. Novick ed., 1995) [hereinafter COLLECTED WORKS].
166
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of our ideals in the world. “Consciously or unconsciously we all strive to make the
kind of a world that we like.”169 But this striving inevitably brings us into conflict
with other human beings, who are equally determined to make the kind of a world they
like.170 According to Holmes, conflicts of this sort cannot be resolved by reason but
only by force.171 That is why in Abrams he refers to ideals as “fighting faiths.”172
This vision of the world lies at the core of his political and legal thought. For
Holmes, human life is characterized by a fundamental and ineradicable conflict between groups—a conflict that is fueled not only by competing material interests but also
by clashing ideologies.173 The ultimate form of this conflict is war174—a notion that
was burned into Holmes’s mind by his experience of the Civil War, in which he was
wounded three times and saw the death of many of his close friends and comrades.175
Likewise, Holmes understood social and political life in terms of group conflict,
such as the struggle between workers and employers.176 He saw the constitutional
order as a neutral framework for channeling such conflict and resolving it by lawful
means.177 This is the view that animates the other judicial opinion for which he is best
known—his dissent in Lochner v. New York.178 There he writes that “a constitution
is not intended to embody a particular economic theory, whether of paternalism and
the organic relation of the citizen to the State or of laissez faire.”179 Instead, the
169

HOLMES, Ideals and Doubts, supra note 97, at 305; see also HOLMES, Natural Law,
supra note 98, at 311.
170
HOLMES, Natural Law, supra note 98, at 311–12.
171
See id. at 312; see also HOLMES, COMMON LAW, supra note 99, at 38 (“[I]t seems to
me clear that the ultima ratio, not only regum, but of private persons, is force, and that at the
bottom of all private relations, however tempered by sympathy and all the social feelings, is a
justifiable self-preference.”); Letter from Oliver Wendell Holmes to Frederick Pollock (Feb. 1,
1920), in 2 HOLMES-POLLOCK LETTERS, supra note 95, at 36, 36 (“I believe that force, mitigated so far as may be by good manners, is the ultima ratio, and between two groups that want
to make inconsistent kinds of world I see no remedy except force.”).
172
Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
173
See supra notes 168–172 and accompanying text; see also Oliver Wendell Holmes, The
Gas-Stokers’ Strike, in 1 COLLECTED WORKS, supra note 168, at 323, 325 [hereinafter Holmes,
Gas-Stokers’ Strike].
174
See, HOLMES, Natural Law, supra note 98, at 310; Letter from Oliver Wendell Holmes
to Harold J. Laski (Oct. 26, 1919), in HOLMES-LASKI LETTERS, supra note 113, at 217, 217;
Letter from Oliver Wendell Holmes to Frederick Pollock (Feb. 1, 1920), in 2 HOLMESPOLLOCK LETTERS, supra note 95, at 36, 36; Letter from Oliver Wendell Holmes to John C.H.
Wu (Aug. 26, 1926), in MIND AND FAITH, supra note 100, at 431, 431–32.
175
For valuable discussions of Holmes’s Civil War experience and the impact it had on him,
see 1 MARK DEWOLFE HOWE, JUSTICE OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES 80–175 (1957); LOUIS
MENAND, THE METAPHYSICAL CLUB 49–69 (2001); WHITE, supra note 116, 49–86.
176
See Vegelahn v. Guntner, 44 N.E. 1077, 1081–82 (Mass. 1896) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
177
See OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, Law and the Court, in COLLECTED LEGAL PAPERS,
supra note 97, at 291, 294–95 [hereinafter HOLMES, Law and the Court].
178
198 U.S. 45, 74–76 (1905) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
179
Id. at 75.
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Constitution establishes an arena within which groups with “fundamentally differing
views” can struggle for dominance.180 “Every opinion tends to become a law,” and
except in the most extreme cases, the courts should not interpret the Constitution to
prevent “the natural outcome of a dominant opinion” or to interfere with “the right of
a majority to embody their opinions in law.”181
Holmes’s discussion of censorship in Abrams reflects the same general views that
I have just outlined. The ideals or beliefs that are held by a group reflect its desires
and its conception of the good.182 Every group seeks to translate its beliefs into action
and ultimately into law.183 In a democratic system, the power to make law rests with
the majority. If the majority has no doubt about the validity of its ideal, has a strong
desire to achieve it, and is confident of its power to do so, it will “naturally express
[its] wishes in law and sweep away all opposition” from other groups who are fighting
to make the world conform to their own competing ideals.184 For all of these reasons,
censorship is “perfectly logical.”185
C. Holmes’s Defense of Free Speech
1. The Negative Dimension of Holmes’s Argument: A Skeptical View of the
World
Holmes began his first major work, The Common Law, by observing that “[t]he
life of the law has not been logic: it has been experience.”186 His defense of free
speech in Abrams reflects the same movement of thought.187 Having explained why
censorship is “perfectly logical,” he goes on to contend that our experience has led—
or should lead—the American people to reject it in favor of freedom of expression.188
The experience that Holmes points to is the “realiz[ation] that time has upset many
fighting faiths.”189
180

Id. at 76.
Id. at 75–76.
182
See supra notes 168–169 and accompanying text.
183
See OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, Introduction to the General Survey, in COLLECTED
LEGAL PAPERS, supra note 97, at 298, 298 (“Beliefs, so far as they bear upon the attainment
of a wish (as most beliefs do), lead in the first place to a social attitude, and later to combined
social action, that is, to law.”).
184
Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
185
Id.
186
HOLMES, COMMON LAW, supra note 99, at 5.
187
Abrams, 250 U.S. at 630 (Holmes, J., dissenting). For similar observations, see WHITE,
supra note 116, at 435; Vincent Blasi, Holmes and the Marketplace of Ideas, 2004 SUP. CT.
REV. 1, 2–3 [hereinafter Blasi, Holmes].
188
Abrams, 250 U.S. at 630 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
189
Id.
181
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In this way, Holmes’s argument for free speech is based on a highly skeptical
view of the world. “Certitude is not the test of certainty. We have been cock-sure of
many things that were not so.”190 For this reason, it is important to explore the factual
basis of our ideals. As Holmes explains in an essay called Ideals and Doubts, our ideals
can be seen as “imperfect social generalizations expressed in terms of emotion. To get
at [their] truth, it is useful to omit the emotion and ask ourselves what those generalizations are and how far they are confirmed by fact accurately ascertained.”191 Ideals
rest on two sorts of “postulates” (or what in Abrams he calls “premises”): (1) “that
such and such a condition or result is desirable,” and (2) “that such and such means
are appropriate to bring it about.”192 Holmes adds:
To know what you want and why you think that such a measure
will help it is the first but by no means the last step towards intelligent legal [or social or political] reform. The other and more
difficult one is to realize what you must give up to get it, and to
consider whether you are ready to pay the price.193
Because these issues involve difficult empirical questions, it makes sense to be skeptical
about ideals, particularly when they seek to bring about “wholesale social regeneration”
through measures such as the socialization of property or suffrage for women.194
The sources of Holmes’s skepticism run much deeper than this, however. Although
the effectiveness of a measure in promoting a particular end may be an empirical
question that is subject to rational assessment, the “desirab[ility]” of the end is not.195
According to Holmes, our desires are “arbitrary” and have no rational foundation.196
And the same is true of our beliefs insofar as they embody our desires.197 In a passage
of Natural Law that sheds great light on Abrams, Holmes writes that “truth” is “root[ed]
in time”:
What we most love and revere generally is determined by early
associations. I love granite rocks and barberry bushes, no doubt
because with them were my earliest joys that reach back through
the past eternity of my life. But while one’s experience thus makes
certain preferences dogmatic for oneself, recognition of how they
came to be so leaves one able to see that others, poor souls, may
190
191
192
193
194
195
196
197

HOLMES, Natural Law, supra note 98, at 311.
HOLMES, Ideals and Doubts, supra note 97, at 306.
Id.
Id. at 307.
Id. at 306–07.
Id. at 306.
HOLMES, Natural Law, supra note 98, at 312.
Id.
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be equally dogmatic about something else. And this again means
scepticism. Not that one’s belief or love does not remain. Not that
we would not fight and die for it if important—we all, whether we
know it or not, are fighting to make the kind of a world that we
should like—but that we have learned to recognize that others will
fight and die to make a different world, with equal sincerity or belief. Deep-seated preferences can not be argued about—you can
not argue a man into liking a glass of beer—and therefore, when
differences are sufficiently far reaching, we try to kill the other
man rather than let him have his way. But that is perfectly consistent with admitting that, so far as appears, his grounds are just
as good as ours.198
As this passage makes clear, Holmes’s skepticism is founded not only on uncertainty about the factual basis of particular ideals, but also on the notion that at bottom
those ideals are merely subjective. Although the beliefs that I hold have meaning for
me, I have no reason to believe that they possess any “universal validity.”199 Instead,
I can recognize that just as my beliefs arise from my own experience, the beliefs of
other people arise from theirs. This point does not lead Holmes to conclude that I
should respect the right of others to hold their own beliefs. According to Holmes, “we
all . . . are fighting to make the kind of a world that we should like,” and it is perfectly
reasonable for me to use force against those who stand in my way.200
Thus, Holmes is not arguing that we have a duty to tolerate or respect the opinions
of others. But the skepticism that he articulates in essays like Ideals and Doubts and
Natural Law does illuminate the argument that he makes in Abrams—in particular, by
pointing to difficulties in the rationale for censorship. That rationale states that “[i]f
you have no doubt of your premises or your power and want a certain result with all
your heart you naturally express your wishes in law and sweep away all opposition.”201
Holmes’s skepticism shows that we have reason to question our premises and to ask
whether we do want a particular result with all our hearts. At the same time, it raises
questions about whether we actually have the power to achieve our ideals, both because they may not have a sufficient basis in fact, and because other people will oppose
our efforts and fight for their own ideals “with equal sincerity or belief.”202 Finally,
even if we succeed in realizing our beliefs in the world, the fact that they are “root[ed]
in time”203 also means that they are fated to pass away with time.
198

Id. at 311–12.
Id. at 310.
200
Id. at 311–12.
201
Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
202
HOLMES, Natural Law, supra note 98, at 312; see also Holmes, Gas-Stokers’ Strike,
supra note 173, at 325.
203
HOLMES, Natural Law, supra note 98, at 311.
199

688

WILLIAM & MARY BILL OF RIGHTS JOURNAL

[Vol. 19:661

2. The Positive Dimension of Holmes’s Argument
This discussion helps to explain the skeptical move that Holmes makes in
Abrams—the assertion that our experience teaches that “time has upset many fighting
faiths.”204 Standing alone, however, this move is not sufficient to justify a commitment
to freedom of speech.205 As Holmes wrote to Hand in June 1918 (at about the same
time that he wrote Natural Law), “if for any reason you did care enough [to suppress
free speech in a particular situation,] you wouldn’t care a damn for the suggestion that
you were acting on a provisional hypothesis and might be wrong. That is the condition
of every act.”206
In Abrams, Holmes undertakes to explain why, even though it is logical to censor
opposing views, the majority nevertheless may decide to restrain itself from doing so
by adopting a constitutional provision that protects the freedom of speech—and by
accepting a broad interpretation of that provision today.207 To make this case, Holmes
needs to formulate a justification that goes beyond skepticism to show that the members
of society can better promote their good by allowing free speech than by suppressing
it. This is his central argument:
[W]hen men have realized that time has upset many fighting
faiths, they may come to believe even more than they believe the
very foundations of their own conduct that the ultimate good desired is better reached by free trade in ideas—that the best test of
truth is the power of the thought to get itself accepted in the competition of the market, and that truth is the only ground upon which
their wishes safely can be carried out.208
Holmes’s marketplace-of-ideas metaphor struck a deep chord in American culture.209 Americans have often understood this image to represent an arena for the free
204

Abrams, 250 U.S. at 630 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
As Holmes indicates in Natural Law, the form of skepticism that he embraces “has no
bearing upon our conduct”; “[w]e still shall fight,” not only for survival but also to make the
sort of world we would like. HOLMES, Natural Law, supra note 98, at 311, 315–16.
206
Letter from Oliver Wendell Holmes to Learned Hand (June 24, 1918), in Gunther, supra
note 114, at 756, 757.
207
Abrams, 250 U.S. at 630 (Holmes, J., dissenting). For a persuasive argument that Holmes
believed that the First Amendment and other constitutional provisions ultimately should be
interpreted in accord with the views of contemporary society rather than original meaning,
see H.L. POHLMAN, JUSTICE OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES: FREE SPEECH AND THE LIVING
CONSTITUTION 222–41 (1991).
208
Abrams, 250 U.S. at 630 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
209
As Justice O’Connor has remarked, over time Holmes’s “metaphor . . . has become
almost as familiar as the principle that it sought to justify.” Shapero v. Ky. Bar Ass’n, 486
U.S. 466, 483 (1988) (O’Connor, J., dissenting).
205
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and open exchange of views, an institution which allows individual liberty to flourish
and at the same time promotes the good of society.210 American legal and political discourse has often taken the image the same way.211 In these respects, Holmes’s notion
of a marketplace of ideas undeniably has had a positive impact on American law,
politics, and culture. I want to show, however, that this is only part of the story and
that the image also reflects a darker and more problematic vision of human life.
a. The Marketplace of Ideas
In asserting that “the best test of truth is the power of the thought to get itself
accepted in the competition of the market,”212 Holmes of course is drawing an analogy
between free discussion and the marketplace for goods. According to classical economic theory, market competition tends to ensure the success of those goods that
satisfy the needs and desires of consumers to the greatest extent and at the lowest
cost.213 In the same way, Holmes suggests that the ideas that prevail in public debate
will be those that best promote the interests of society’s members.214 It follows that
just as economic competition advances social welfare, so does competition in the
marketplace of ideas.
In this way, it may seem that Holmes believes that “free trade in ideas”215 will
promote the good of the community as a whole. But as he makes clear in one of his
earliest writings—his note on the Gas-Stokers’ Strike—there is no such thing as a
common good or an “identity of interest” within the community.216 Instead, as we
have seen, he holds that the society consists of different groups with conflicting interests and beliefs.217 If that is true, then the ideas that prevail in the market will be
those that promote the interests and beliefs of the predominant portion of the society.
210

See, e.g., RODNEY A. SMOLLA, FREE SPEECH IN AN OPEN SOCIETY 7–8 (1992).
See, e.g., ERIC BARENDT, FREEDOM OF SPEECH 35, 48 (2d ed., 2007).
212
Abrams, 250 U.S. at 630 (Holmes, J., dissenting). Holmes’s notion of the marketplace
of ideas has generated a great deal of scholarly discussion. For some commentary that is generally sympathetic to this notion, see Lillian R. BeVier, The Invisible Hand of the Marketplace
of Ideas, in ETERNALLY VIGILANT: FREE SPEECH IN THE MODERN ERA, supra note 68, at 232;
Blasi, Holmes, supra note 187; Richard A. Posner, The Speech Market and the Legacy of
Schenck, in ETERNALLY VIGILANT: FREE SPEECH IN THE MODERN ERA, supra note 68. For
some commentary that is generally critical, see BAKER, HUMAN LIBERTY, supra note 9, at 6;
MEIKLEJOHN, POLITICAL FREEDOM, supra note 10, at 60–65, 71–75; FREDERICK SCHAUER,
FREE SPEECH: A PHILOSOPHICAL ENQUIRY 15–34 (1982); Owen M. Fiss, Why the State?, 100
HARV. L. REV. 781, 782–83 (1987).
213
See, e.g., Paul J. McNulty, Economic Theory and the Meaning of Competition, 82 Q.J.
ECON. 639, 643–44 (1968).
214
Abrams, 250 U.S. at 630 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
215
Id.
216
Holmes, Gas-Stokers’ Strike, supra note 173, at 324–25.
217
See supra text accompanying notes 173–76.
211
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And that is exactly what he says in Gitlow v. New York:218 if ideas like “proletarian
dictatorship are destined to be accepted by the dominant forces of the community,
the only meaning of free speech is that they should be given their chance and have
their way.”219
b. Holmes’s Darwinism and the Marketplace of Ideas
In this respect, Holmes’s theory of free speech is consistent with his deeply held
Darwinian views about life and law. Although he may not have read The Origin of
Species, Holmes was deeply influenced by the theory of evolution—a theory which
was at the cutting edge of science in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries,
and which plays a pervasive role in his thought.220 According to Holmes, the natural
world is characterized by a “struggle for life” that “tend[s] in the long run to aid the
survival of the fittest.”221 Moreover, this “struggle does not stop [with the lower animals], but is equally the law of human existence.”222 The most dramatic illustration
of this point may be found in those extreme situations where one can save one’s own
life only at the expense of another’s: “If a man is on a plank in the deep sea which will
only float one, and a stranger lays hold of it, he will thrust him off if he can.”223 But
the principle is not limited to those cases. Within a civilized society, self-interest is
“mitigated by sympathy, prudence, and all the social and moral qualities,” but “in the
last resort a man rightly prefers his own interest to that of his neighbors,”224 and this
218

268 U.S. 652 (1925).
Id. at 673 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
220
For good discussions of Holmes’s Darwinism, see 2 HOWE, supra note 175, at 44–50;
Blasi, Holmes, supra note 187, at 24–33; E. Donald Elliott, Holmes and Evolution: Legal
Process as Artificial Intelligence, 13 J. LEGAL STUD. 113 (1984); Jan Vetter, The Evolution
of Holmes, Holmes and Evolution, 72 CAL. L. REV. 343, 363–67 (1984); and the essays in THE
LEGACY OF OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR. (Robert W. Gordon ed., 1992).
221
Holmes, Gas-Stokers’ Strike, supra note 173, at 325.
222
Id. This Darwinian vision of human life was the basis for Holmes’s own social ideal: the
use of science to improve the quality of the race. This eugenic ideal can be found throughout
his writings. See, e.g., Holmes, The Soldier’s Faith, in 3 COLLECTED WORKS, supra note 168,
at 486, 487 [hereinafter Holmes, The Soldier’s Faith]; HOLMES, Law and the Court, supra
note 177, at 296; HOLMES, Ideals and Doubts, supra note 97, at 306. The same ideal was at the
heart of his notorious opinion in Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200 (1927). In upholding a compulsory
sterilization law, he wrote that “[i]t is better for all the world, if instead of waiting to execute
degenerate offspring for crime, or to let them starve for their imbecility, society can prevent
those who are manifestly unfit from continuing their kind. . . . Three generations of imbeciles
are enough.” Id. at 207. As Holmes later told Laski, in this decision “I . . . felt that I was getting
near to the first principle of real reform.” Letter from Oliver Wendell Holmes to Harold J. Laski
(May 12, 1927), in 2 HOLMES-LASKI LETTERS, supra note 113, at 941, 942.
223
HOLMES, COMMON LAW, supra note 99, at 38.
224
Holmes, Gas-Stokers’ Strike, supra note 173, at 325.
219
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principle lies “at the bottom of all private relations.”225 For example, individuals
compete with one another in the economic arena, as do organized groups such as
workers and employers.226
As we have seen, Holmes believes that politics and law also involves battles
between different social groups, which have different material interests as well as
different ideals and views of the world.227 In this way, the “struggle for life” between
different groups also involves a “struggle for life among competing ideas,” leading
to “the ultimate victory and survival of the strongest.”228
Thus, Holmes’s Darwinism sheds a good deal of light on his argument in
Abrams.229 When he speaks of the “the power of the thought to get itself accepted
in the competition of the market,”230 he means much the same thing as he does in
earlier writings when he refers to “the struggle for life among competing ideas.”231
This struggle does not take place in the abstract; instead, it is part and parcel of the
“struggle for life” between different social groups.232 It follows that, for Holmes, the
beliefs that will prevail in the marketplace of ideas are not those that are intrinsically
more true or correct—Holmes always eschews any idea of absolute truth233—but
rather those that come to be accepted by the most powerful part of the community.234
225

HOLMES, COMMON LAW, supra note 99, at 38.
See, e.g., Plant v. Woods, 57 N.E. 1011, 1016 (Mass. 1900) (Holmes, C.J., dissenting)
(“[T]he strike [is] a lawful instrument in the universal struggle of life . . . .”); Vegelahn v.
Guntner, 44 N.E. 1077, 1080–82 (Mass. 1896) (Holmes, J., dissenting); HOLMES, Privilege,
Malice, and Intent, in COLLECTED LEGAL PAPERS, supra note 97, at 117, 120–21 [hereinafter
HOLMES, Privilege, Malice, and Intent].
227
See supra text accompanying notes 173–85.
228
HOLMES, Law in Science, supra note 111, at 220. For similar language, see id. at 221
(“the struggle for existence between competing ideas”); HOLMES, Holdsworth’s English Law,
in COLLECTED LEGAL PAPERS, supra note 97, at 285, 287 (“the struggle for life carried on
among ideas”); id. at 288 (“the development of ideas and their struggle for life”).
229
For another discussion of this point, see Blasi, supra note 187, at 24–31.
230
Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
231
HOLMES, Law in Science, supra note 111, at 220. Many of Holmes’s writings implicitly
treat competition as a form of the struggle for life, and he makes this point explicit in his dissenting opinion in Vegelahn v. Guntner, 44 N.E. 1077 (Mass. 1896):
I have seen the suggestion made that the conflict between employers and
employed was not competition. But I venture to assume that none of
my brethren would rely on that suggestion. If the policy on which our
law is founded is too narrowly expressed in the term “free competition,”
we may substitute “free struggle for life.” Certainly, the policy is not
limited to struggles between persons of the same class, competing for
the same end. It applies to all conflicts of temporal interests.
Id. at 1081 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
232
See, e.g., id.; Holmes, Gas-Stokers’ Strike, supra note 173, at 325.
233
See, e.g., HOLMES, Ideals and Doubts, supra note 97, at 304–05; Letter from Oliver
Wendell Holmes to Learned Hand (June 24, 1918), in Gunther, supra note 114, at 756, 757.
234
Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 673 (1925) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
226
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c. Holmes’s Theory of Force
Holmes’s Darwinism was merely one element of his broader scientific or philosophical view of the world—a view that provides the most comprehensive framework
for understanding his approach to the First Amendment and indeed to law in general.
According to Holmes, all of the phenomena in the universe are governed by the same
principles.235 The terms that he most often uses to describe these principles are “force,”
“energy,” and “power”—words that he treats as more or less synonymous. For Holmes,
these principles shape the workings of the universe on every level.236 The “force of
gravitation” governs “the conduct of bodies in space.”237 The Darwinian forces of
natural selection shape the development of species in the natural world.238 The social
world is no different: it too is governed by forces, from the competitive forces which
govern the market,239 to the struggle between different groups such as workers and
employers,240 to the political process, which is governed by “the will” of whatever body
or class currently possesses the “supreme power in the community.”241 Holmes defines
law itself as the application of “the public force,” which seeks to bring about certain
results either directly through the “use of force” or indirectly “through men’s fears.”242
235

HOLMES, The Bar as a Profession, in COLLECTED LEGAL PAPERS, supra note 97, at
153, 159; HOLMES, Path, supra note 97, at 180.
236
One important source for this notion seems to have been the theory of vis viva. This
theory, which originated with Gottfried Leibniz and was popular in some mid-nineteenthcentury scientific and philosophical circles, posited that there was “a dynamic force—the vis
viva—[that was] common to all nature.” Anne C. Dailey, Holmes and the Romantic Mind,
48 DUKE L.J. 429, 465, 476 (1998). William James introduced Holmes to the theory in 1867,
and he read and thought about the subject for several weeks before turning to other matters. See
1 HOWE, supra note 175, at 255–56.
237
HOLMES, Natural Law, supra note 98, at 313.
238
Holmes, Gas-Stokers’ Strike, supra note 173, at 325.
239
See, e.g., Vegelahn v. Guntner, 44 N.E. 1077, 1080–82 (Mass. 1896) (Holmes, J.,
dissenting).
240
See, e.g., id.
241
Holmes, Gas-Stokers’ Strike, supra note 173, at 325.
242
HOLMES, COMMON LAW, supra note 99, at 42, 169; HOLMES, Path, supra note 97, at
167, 170. In accord with this view, Holmes defines “[a] legal right” as “nothing but a permission to exercise certain natural powers, and upon certain conditions to obtain protection,
restitution, or compensation by the aid of the public force.” HOLMES, COMMON LAW, supra
note 99, at 169. And he maintains that the business of the legal profession is “the prediction of
the incidence of the public force through the instrumentality of the courts,” since “[p]eople want
to know under what circumstances and how far they will run the risk of coming against what
is so much stronger than themselves.” HOLMES, Path, supra note 97, at 167. This is the meaning of Holmes’s famous image of the “bad man”: law essentially consists in the application
of force, because if
you want to know the law and nothing else, you must look at it as a bad
man, who cares only for the material consequences which such knowledge enables him to predict, not as a good one, who finds his reasons
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A careful reading of Holmes’s opinions and extrajudicial writings shows that he
understands speech and thought in the same terms. Human beings do not create the
forces that exist in the world, but they can “giv[e] a direction to [those] force[s]”
through the use of “intelligence.”243 The architect does this to a greater degree than
the brick layer because the architect determines the structure of the entire building.244
On a higher level, Holmes suggests that “the abstract speculations” of Descartes and
Kant have “become a [greater] practical force controlling the conduct of men” than the
conquests of Napoleon.245 Thus, “the most far-reaching form of power” that human
beings can aspire to “is the command of ideas.”246
This is the theory that underlies the argument for free speech in Abrams. Holmes
equates the “truth” of an idea with the amount of “power” that it has.247 In turn, the
“power of [a] thought” lies in its ability to gain acceptance and to thereby “become a
practical force controlling the conduct of men.”248 It follows that “the best test of truth
is the power of the thought to get itself accepted in the competition of the market.”249
D. Summarizing Holmes’s Argument
If we pull together the various strands of Holmes’s argument, we can summarize
his view as follows. Human beings act in order to live and to promote their own
for conduct, whether inside the law or outside of it, in the vaguer sanctions
of conscience.
Id. at 171.
243
HOLMES, Economic Elements, in COLLECTED LEGAL PAPERS, supra note 97, at 279,
281; Letter from Oliver Wendell Holmes to Harold J. Laski (May 12, 1927), in 2 HOLMESLASKI LETTERS, supra note 113, at 941, 942; see also Letter from Oliver Wendell Holmes
to Harold J. Laski (May 21, 1927), in id. at 945, 945-46.
244
See Letter from Oliver Wendell Holmes to Harold J. Laski (May 12, 1927), in 2 HOLMESLASKI LETTERS, supra note 113, at 941, 942.
245
HOLMES, Path, supra note 97, at 201–02.
246
Id. at 201.
247
Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
248
Id.; HOLMES, Path, supra note 97, at 201–02.
249
Abrams, 250 U.S. at 630 (Holmes, J., dissenting). This test is parallel to the one that
Holmes applied to human beings themselves. As he said in 1897:
I know of no true measure of men except the total of human energy
which they embody—counting everything, with due allowance for
quality, [from physical stamina and courage to the capacity for poetic
expression or philosophical speculation]. The final test of this energy
is battle in some form—actual war—the crush of Arctic ice—the fight
for mastery in the market or the court.
Holmes, George Otis Shattuck, in 3 COLLECTED WORKS, supra note 168, at 492, 494.
Holmes also used the notion of energy or power to describe the relationship between
human beings and the broader forces at work in the universe. As he wrote to Cohen, “I think
the best image for man is an electric light—the spark feels isolated and independent but really
is only a moment in a current.” Letter from Oliver Wendell Holmes to Morris Cohen (Sept. 6,
1920), in THE ESSENTIAL HOLMES, supra note 168, at 105, 106.
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welfare, and they form beliefs about what will best promote these ends. Initially,
these actions and beliefs have only instrumental value, but over time they come to be
regarded as ends in themselves, that is, as ideals. Conflicts arise between groups who
have differing ideals and material interests. These conflicts cannot be resolved by
reason but only by force.
In a modern democratic society, the “supreme power in the community” rests
with the majority.250 If the majority strongly believes in a particular ideal and has no
doubt about its power to achieve it, it will naturally write that ideal into law and punish
anyone who tries to obstruct its realization, whether that obstruction takes the form of
conduct or expression.
It follows that censorship is a “perfectly logical” course of action.251 But experience teaches that our efforts to achieve an ideal are likely to fail in the end. We may
not have fully thought out what we want or what means will be effective to attain it.
We may lack the power to realize our ideals in view of the forces at play within the
society or the natural world. Finally, because any given ideal is rooted in experiences
at a particular place and time, it will also fade over time. For these reasons, it makes
sense to adopt a more skeptical attitude toward our ideals. Although we will still fight
for them with all our strength, we should believe even more strongly in the workings
of the marketplace of ideas, a forum in which different ideals compete with one
another for acceptance. Competition will lead to the optimal results in this marketplace just as it does in the economic marketplace. This competition can be understood
as a Darwinian “struggle for life among competing ideas,”252 which reflects the deeper
“struggle for life” between the groups who hold them.253 In both cases, the struggle
will “tend in the long run to [promote] the survival of the fittest.”254 To put it another
way, the ideas that prevail in the marketplace will be the most powerful ones, that is,
the ones that are best able to gain acceptance from the community, or, more specifically, from the most powerful groups within it. In this way, the marketplace of ideas
reflects the interaction of forces in the larger world. Although we may not be able to
see it, the outcome of this conflict has been determined ahead of time, because human
affairs are governed by the same deterministic forces that apply to all other phenomena.
If the outcome is predetermined, then it is futile to oppose it by censoring speech: if
certain beliefs “are destined to be accepted by the dominant forces of the community,
the only meaning of free speech is that they should be given their chance and have
their way.”255 The ideas that prevail in this process can be described as the “truth”256
because they represent the conception of the good that is held by the dominant group,
250
251
252
253
254
255
256

Holmes, Gas-Stokers’ Strike, supra note 173, at 325.
Abrams, 250 U.S. at 630 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
HOLMES, Law in Science, supra note 111, at 220.
E.g., Holmes, Gas-Stokers’ Strike, supra note 173, at 325.
Id.
Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 673 (1925) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
Abrams, 250 U.S. at 630 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
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and because this group and the beliefs that it holds have emerged though a process
that reflects the objective workings of the forces that govern the world. This process
provides the best test that we have to determine the validity or truth of our beliefs, and
only beliefs that survive this process can provide a reliable basis for seeking “the
ultimate good” that we desire.257
IV. A LIBERAL HUMANIST CRITIQUE OF HOLMESIAN FREE SPEECH THEORY
A. The Inadequacy of Holmes’s Argument for Free Speech
The first problem with Holmes’s argument in Abrams is that it does not provide
a convincing theory of freedom of speech. This is not simply my judgment—it is
Holmes’s. On October 26, 1919, at virtually the same time that he was drafting the
Abrams dissent, Holmes wrote a letter to Laski.258 Laski, who was then teaching at
Harvard Law School, was under fire for criticizing the Boston police commissioner
and for siding with striking police officers during a labor dispute.259 While Holmes
expressed sympathy for his friend’s plight, he also wrote that he didn’t “believe in
[free speech] as a theory.”260 In language that has much in common with the Abrams
opinion, he continued:
Of course when I say I don’t believe in it as a theory I don’t mean
that I do believe in the opposite as a theory. But on their premises
it seems to me logical in the Catholic Church to kill heretics and
the Puritans to whip Quakers—and I see nothing more wrong in
it from our ultimate standards than I do in killing Germans when
257

Id. Just as the truth that prevails within a particular society ultimately depends on force,
so does the truth that prevails on an international level. This was the meaning of Holmes’s
remark that “truth was the majority vote of that nation that could lick all others.” HOLMES,
Natural Law, supra note 98, at 310; Letter from Oliver Wendell Holmes to Learned Hand
(June 24, 1918), in Gunther, supra note 114, at 756, 757.
258
Letter from Oliver Wendell Holmes to Harold J. Laski (Oct. 26, 1919), in 1 HOLMESLASKI LETTERS, supra note 113, at 217, 217–18. The Abrams case was argued on October 21
and 22, 1919. Abrams, 250 U.S. at 616. Some of Holmes’s letters suggest that he drafted his
dissent no later than October 26, the same day on which he wrote to Laski. See Letter from
Oliver Wendell Holmes to Frederick Pollock (Oct. 26, 1919), in 2 HOLMES-POLLOCK LETTERS,
supra note 95, at 27, 28–29 (stating that he has “prepared dissenting statements in one or two
cases, subject to what may happen,” and immediately adding, “I hope that we have heard the
last, or nearly the last, of the Espionage Act cases”); Letter from Oliver Wendell Holmes to
Frederick Pollock (Nov. 6, 1919), in id. at 29 (referring to “a case that I can’t mention yet
[apparently Abrams] to which I have sent round a dissent that was prepared to be ready as
soon as the [majority] opinion was circulated”).
259
For a brief account of the controversy, see 1 HOLMES-LASKI LETTERS, supra note 113,
at 213, 213 n.1 (editor’s note to Laski’s letter of Oct. 8, 1919).
260
Letter from Oliver Wendell Holmes to Harold J. Laski (Oct. 26, 1919), in id. at 217, 217.
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we are at war. When you are thoroughly convinced that you are
right—wholeheartedly desire an end—and have no doubt of your
power to accomplish it—I see nothing but municipal regulations
to interfere with your using your power to accomplish it.261
As this passage makes clear, Holmes means what he says in Abrams when he
asserts that censorship is “perfectly logical.”262 According to Holmes, it is natural for
human beings to use their power to achieve their ideals and “to make the kind of a
world that [they] should like.”263 To this end, they naturally use force against anyone
who stands in their way.264 If one understands human action in this manner, it is very
difficult to explain why the dominant group should not simply impose its own view and
“sweep away all opposition.”265 Holmes formulated this view before the Espionage
Act cases ever reached the Supreme Court,266 and he never abandoned it: more than
a decade after Abrams, he was still writing to Laski in the same vein.267
What, then, is the status of free speech? In his October 26 letter, Holmes refers to
the First Amendment as a mere “municipal regulation[ ]”268—that is, a positive rule
that has been adopted in a particular legal system, but that lacks any universal validity
or compelling theoretical justification. Likewise, in Abrams, he says that free speech
is “an experiment” that is “based upon imperfect knowledge” as to the best way of
promoting the security and well-being of the society.269 But these descriptions do not
sound compelling enough to show that the Constitution should be interpreted to impose
a broad limitation on “the right of a majority to embody their opinions in law.”270
Of course, one could simply rely on the “sweeping” language of the First Amendment to justify strong judicial protection for freedom of speech, and Holmes does
make this move in Abrams.271 But the constitutional text is hardly a model of clarity.
Earlier the same year, in Schenck, Debs, and Frohwerk, Holmes himself had adopted
a much less protective interpretation which allowed the government to restrict speech
whenever it had a tendency to harm other social interests.272 In an earlier case,
261

Id.
Abrams, 250 U.S. at 630 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
263
Id.; HOLMES, Natural Law, supra note 98, at 311.
264
See HOLMES, Natural Law, supra note 98, at 311–12.
265
Abrams, 250 U.S. at 630 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
266
See Letter from Oliver Wendell Holmes to Harold J. Laski (July 7, 1918), in 1 HOLMESLASKI LETTERS, supra note 113, at 160, 160–61, quoted in note 166 above.
267
See Letter from Oliver Wendell Holmes to Harold J. Laski (May 18, 1930), in 2
HOLMES-LASKI LETTERS, supra note 113, at 1249, 1250.
268
Letter from Oliver Wendell Holmes to Harold J. Laski (Oct. 26, 1919), in 1 HOLMESLASKI LETTERS, supra note 113, at 217, 217.
269
Abrams, 250 U.S. at 630 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
270
Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 75 (1905) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
271
Abrams, 250 U.S. at 630–31 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
272
See supra Part II.B.
262
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Patterson v. Colorado,273 he had taken an even narrower view and had asserted that
the First Amendment was meant to embody the Blackstonian doctrine that free expression consisted in immunity from previous restraint but not from subsequent punishment.274 Thus, Holmes’s appeal to the constitutional language was not enough to make
up for the lack of a convincing theoretical argument.275
This leads to one of the most remarkable and ironic features of Holmes’s position.
Because he cannot give a strong reasoned defense of the First Amendment, he transforms free speech itself into a kind of “fighting faith.”276 This comes across in a striking
way in the Abrams dissent: within just a few lines, Holmes moves from a deeply skeptical view of the world (“when men have realized that time has upset many fighting
faiths”), to a powerful statement of belief (“they may come to believe even more than
they believe the very foundations of their own conduct”), and finally to a stirring call
to arms (“we should be eternally vigilant against attempts to check the expression of
opinions that we loathe and believe to be fraught with death”).277 This rhetoric echoes
his letter to Laski, in which he says that while “I don’t believe in [free speech] as a
theory,” “I hope I would die for it.”278 In this way, free speech becomes a sort of
ideological or existential commitment without any strong rational foundation.279 As
273

205 U.S. 454 (1907).
Id. at 462.
275
Similarly, while Holmes alluded to the controversy over the Sedition Act of 1798, he
made no effort to demonstrate that his interpretation of the First Amendment had substantial
historical support. See Abrams, 250 U.S. at 630 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
276
Id.
277
Id.
278
Letter from Oliver Wendell Holmes to Harold J. Laski (Oct. 26, 1919), in 1 HOLMESLASKI LETTERS, supra note 113, at 217, 217. On the same day, Holmes wrote to Pollock in
like terms: “in the abstract, I have no very enthusiastic belief [in free speech], though I hope
I would die for it.” Letter from Oliver Wendell Holmes to Frederick Pollock (Oct. 26, 1919),
in 2 HOLMES-POLLOCK LETTERS, supra note 95, at 27, 29.
279
This understanding of Holmes’s views on the First Amendment is consistent with many
of the statements that he makes elsewhere about faith. The best known appears in The Soldier’s
Faith, a Memorial Day speech that he delivered at Harvard in 1895. Holmes, The Soldier’s
Faith, supra note 222, at 486. There he says:
I do not know what is true. I do not know the meaning of the universe.
But in the midst of doubt, in the collapse of creeds, there is one thing I do
not doubt, . . . and that is that the faith is true and adorable which leads
a soldier to throw away his life in obedience to a blindly accepted duty,
in a cause which he little understands, in a plan of campaign of which he
has no notion, under tactics of which he does not see the use.
Id. at 487; see also id. at 488 (“[Y]ou know that man has in him that unspeakable somewhat
which makes him capable of miracle, able to lift himself by the might of his own soul, unaided,
able to face annihilation for a blind belief.”); Holmes, Ipswich, in 3 COLLECTED WORKS, supra
note 168, at 502, 503 (“We all, the most unbelieving of us, walk by faith. We do our work and
live our lives not merely to vent and realize our inner force, but with a blind and trembling hope
that somehow the world will be a little better for our striving.”). Statements like these have
led some scholars to describe Holmes as an existentialist. See, e.g., ALBERT W. ALSCHULER,
274
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Abrams shows, this can make for a rhetorically powerful defense of free speech.
But it also makes it very hard to determine the scope and limits of that freedom in
a reasoned way.
B. Free Speech and Holmes’s Theory of Force
The second problem with Holmes’s view is that it rejects the basic tenets of the
liberal humanist approach to freedom of expression, and instead conceives of that
freedom in a way that connects it with force and domination.
This point can best be made by comparing Holmes’s view with that of Justice
Louis Brandeis, whose judicial opinions contain some of the classic liberal humanist
defenses of free speech and other “fundamental personal rights.”280 In Whitney v.
California, Brandeis articulated his own vision of the First Amendment in this way:
Those who won our independence believed that the final end
of the State was to make men free to develop their faculties; and
that in its government the deliberative forces should prevail over
the arbitrary. They valued liberty both as an end and as a means.
They believed liberty to be the secret of happiness and courage to
be the secret of liberty. They believed that freedom to think as
you will and to speak as you think are means indispensable to the
discovery and spread of political truth; that without free speech and
assembly discussion would be futile; that with them, discussion
affords ordinarily adequate protection against the dissemination
of noxious doctrine; that the greatest menace to freedom is an
inert people; that public discussion is a political duty; and that
this should be a fundamental principle of the American government. They recognized the risks to which all human institutions
are subject. But they knew that order cannot be secured merely
through fear of punishment for its infraction; that it is hazardous
to discourage thought, hope and imagination; that fear breeds
repression; that repression breeds hate; that hate menaces stable
government; that the path of safety lies in the opportunity to discuss freely supposed grievances and proposed remedies; and that
the fitting remedy for evil counsels is good ones. Believing in
LAW WITHOUT VALUES: THE LIFE, WORK, AND LEGACY OF JUSTICE HOLMES 18–19 (2000); cf.
Richard A. Posner, Introduction to THE ESSENTIAL HOLMES, supra note 168, at xxix (“Holmes
believed in blind commitment, and in this we can see folly if we like, or an echo of Kierkegaard
and an anticipation of Sartre and Camus, or merely an admission of human fallibility: all our
commitments must be blind because we are blind.”).
280
Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 374 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring) (footnote
omitted).
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the power of reason as applied through public discussion, they
eschewed silence coerced by law—the argument of force in its
worst form. Recognizing the occasional tyrannies of governing
majorities, they amended the Constitution so that free speech and
assembly should be guaranteed.281
In this passage, Brandeis advances two major justifications for freedom of speech
and thought. First, he contends that liberty is “an end” in itself because it “make[s]
men free to develop their faculties.”282 These faculties include “reason” as well as
“thought, hope, and imagination.”283 This suggests that the inner lives of individuals
have value in themselves—a theme that Brandeis developed the following year in his
dissenting opinion in Olmstead v. United States.284 “The makers of our Constitution,”
he wrote,
undertook to secure conditions favorable to the pursuit of happiness. They recognized the significance of man’s spiritual nature,
of his feelings and of his intellect. They knew that only a part of
the pain, pleasure and satisfactions of life are to be found in material things. They sought to protect Americans in their beliefs, their
thoughts, their emotions and their sensations. They conferred, as
against the Government, the right to be let alone—the most comprehensive of rights and the right most valued by civilized men.285
In Olmstead, Brandeis was speaking of the privacy protected by the Fourth Amendment’s ban on unreasonable searches and seizures.286 But the language that he used
clearly can also be applied to the liberties secured by the First Amendment.287
In Whitney, Brandeis also put forward a second justification for freedom of
expression: that it is essential for democratic deliberation.288 Citizens have a right
as well as a duty to take part in public debate, and this freedom is “indispensable to
the discovery and spread of political truth.”289 In this connection, Brandeis draws a
strong contrast between reason and force. He contends that the founders “[b]eliev[ed]
in the power of reason as applied through public discussion,” and that they sought
281
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to ensure “that in [our] government the deliberative forces should prevail over the
arbitrary.”290 By contrast, he describes censorship as “the argument of force in its
worst form.”291
Holmes joined Brandeis’s opinion in Whitney,292 just as Brandeis had joined
Holmes’s dissents in Abrams and Gitlow.293 It is clear, however, that Holmes does not
share the liberal humanist beliefs expressed in the Whitney opinion (much less those
expressed in the Olmstead dissent, which he did not join). As we have seen, Holmes
denies the most basic premise of liberal humanism: the idea that we are inherently free
beings who are capable of directing our own actions in accord with reason.294 Instead,
he holds that human action ultimately is determined by the same forces that govern
other aspects of the world.295
In denying the idea of human liberty, Holmes also rejects Brandeis’s view that the
freedom of thought and expression is entitled to respect as an end in itself. Of course,
Holmes recognizes that beliefs have meaning and value for those who hold them.296
But this meaning and value are merely subjective.297 For Holmes, an understanding
of law must reflect a “cold[ ],” analytical, objective point of view;298 and from that
perspective, ideals and their expression have no value except to the extent that they
contribute to the workings of the marketplace of ideas.
For these reasons, Holmes does not believe that freedom of speech can be based on
the value of protecting the inner lives of individuals or on the value of self-expression
as such. On the contrary, he often denigrates the individuals whose rights he so eloquently defends. In Abrams, for example, he describes the defendants or their writings as “poor and puny anonymities,” and their views as a “creed of ignorance and
immaturity.”299 In private correspondence, Holmes is even more dismissive of the
litigants who come before him. He refers to his Gitlow dissent as an argument “in
favor of the rights of an anarchist (so-called) to talk drool in favor of the proletarian
290
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Id. at 376. The Whitney opinion also suggests a third rationale for freedom of speech:
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free expression, see Emerson, General Theory, supra note 67, at 884–86.
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v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 672 (1925) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
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dictatorship.”300 And in a letter to Laski discussing United States v. Schwimmer301—
the case in which he defends the right of a pacifist to become an American citizen and
declares that “if there is any principle of the Constitution that more imperatively calls
for attachment than any other it is the principle of free thought—not free thought for
those who agree with us but freedom for the thought that we hate”302—Holmes characterizes the woman involved as a “damned fool[ ],” and adds, “All ’isms seem to me
silly—but this hyperaethereal respect for human life seems perhaps the silliest of all.”303
Nor does Holmes subscribe to Brandeis’s second rationale—the idea that free
speech is necessary for democratic deliberation—in its liberal humanist form. To begin
with, Holmes denies that there is any normative justification for democracy itself.304
Democratic institutions exist not because the people have a right to govern themselves,
but simply because in modern society “the majority have the power in their hands”
and constitute “the de facto supreme power in the community.”305 Holmes also rejects
the Brandeisian belief in the capacity of reason to discern the common good. According to Holmes, the idea of a common good “presupposes an identity of interest between
the different parts of a community which does not exist in fact.”306 Instead, the community is composed of different groups who possess fundamentally different interests
and beliefs. Contrary to Brandeis’s view, the conflict between these competing views
cannot be resolved by reasoned discussion.
For these reasons, Holmes rejects the basic distinction between reason and force
on which liberal humanism rests. Instead, he adopts a view that identifies truth with
power. On this view, “the best test of truth is the power of the thought to get itself
accepted in the competition of the market”307 or (as he puts it in Gitlow) by “the dominant forces of the community.”308
This view can be criticized on both epistemological and moral grounds. First, it
is doubtful that the process that Holmes describes should be regarded as “the best test
of truth.”309 Surely that is not the case with regard to matters of fact. The best test
of whether cigarette smoking causes cancer, or of whether human action is contributing to climate change, is not whether most people in the society believe that it does.
Holmes holds that, to rationally pursue our own good, we must subject our factual beliefs to critical examination, and it seems clear that this is one important function that
300
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the marketplace of ideas is meant to perform.310 But there is no warrant for his further
contention that the best test of an idea’s validity is whether it prevails in the market.
As Holmes recognizes, the market is not a rational process that is governed by a concern with factual accuracy, but instead is a battlefield for conflicts based on interest and
ideology.311 Clearly, it is possible for “the dominant forces of the community”312 to
believe that their own position is best served by the acceptance of beliefs that are not
in fact accurate.
What about normative beliefs? Of course, they are not subject to verification in
the same way as factual ones. Nevertheless, it seems deeply counterintuitive to claim,
as Holmes does, that the best test of their validity is whether they are accepted by the
dominant part of the community.313 For example, during much of American history,
the dominant forces believed that African Americans were inferior and could rightfully
be subjected to slavery and segregation,314 while in Nazi Germany the dominant forces
believed that Jews were subhuman and should be subjected to genocide.315 Yet few
people would now say that those beliefs represented the “truth” even for the times and
places in which they were held. Both historically and today, our commitment to freedom of speech and thought rests in large part on the belief that the existing order does
not necessarily embody the truth, and that it must be subjected to critical evaluation.316
The liberal humanist view offers a different account of political discussion and the
community’s search for truth. It portrays them as collective activities that are possible
only among people who recognize one another as human beings and citizens who are
capable of engaging in reasoned discussion.317 This mutual recognition is not only
310

See supra text accompanying notes 190–94.
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“regarded as beings of an inferior order, and altogether unfit to associate with the white race,
either in social or political relations; and so far inferior, that they had no rights which the white
man was bound to respect; and that the negro might justly and lawfully be reduced to slavery
for his benefit”).
315
See, e.g., RAUL HILBERG, THE DESTRUCTION OF THE EUROPEAN JEWS (3d ed. 2003).
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a precondition for the search for truth, it is also the first and most fundamental truth
that emerges from this process. From that point on, the search for truth is understood
to consist in free and open discussion that reflects a serious effort to ascertain the facts
and to discern the good. This is the image of public discourse that emerges from the
writings of Brandeis, Meiklejohn, and Mill.318 It would be a mistake to believe that,
on this view, public discourse is a wholly rational and dispassionate process that is
guaranteed to arrive at the truth. Liberal humanists recognize that public discussion
may be deeply contentious and ideological. As Mill puts it, “in the human mind,
one-sidedness has always been the rule, and many-sidedness the exception.”319 For
this reason, efforts to determine the truth generally must “be made by the rough
process of a struggle between combatants fighting under hostile banners.”320 Even
when a society makes some progress toward the truth, the result generally is only to
“substitute [] . . . one partial and incomplete truth for another; improvement consisting chiefly in this, that the new fragment of truth is more wanted, more adapted to the
needs of the time, than that which it displaces.”321
In these respects, Mill’s view is quite similar to Holmes’s. At the same time, it
is crucial to recognize the fundamental differences between the two views. For Mill,
people begin by holding one-sided opinions, but they need not end there. Through
a process of thought and discussion, they are capable of developing a broader and
more comprehensive view that seeks in some measure to reconcile opposing values
and perspectives.322 For Holmes, on the other hand, truth is inescapably subjective and
one-sided. People are bound to their own partial perspectives and they “cannot help”
holding the views that they do.323 It is impossible even in principle to resolve deepseated disagreements through the use of reason.324 Instead, those disagreements can
be resolved only by a resort to force, in which the dominant group imposes its values
and beliefs on everyone else.325 If there is a truth that goes beyond the beliefs held by
the dominant group, it is simply the Holmesian truth that, like all other phenomena,
human life is governed by force.
In the course of discussing the epistemological objections to Holmes’s position,
we have begun to consider the moral objections as well. The most basic problem
is that Holmes regards free speech as a means of dominating others. We articulate
and fight for our ideals as part of a “struggle for life” in which we seek to achieve
Speech and the Theory of Free Expression, in HATE SPEECH AND THE CONSTITUTION, at
lxii–lxiii (Steven J. Heyman ed., 1996).
318
See supra text accompanying notes 69–88, 280–91.
319
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320
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322
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324
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325
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superiority over other people and to make the sort of world that we like.326 In
Holmes’s view, the First Amendment protects speech primarily because of the role
that it plays in this process.
The Holmesian view that free speech essentially involves a struggle for power and
domination over others continues to be influential in contemporary First Amendment
jurisprudence. The best illustration is Judge Frank Easterbrook’s opinion in American
Booksellers Association v. Hudnut,327 which addresses the constitutionality of a feminist antipornography ordinance. In enacting this law, the Indianapolis city council
found that pornography caused a variety of serious harms to women.328 Remarkably,
Easterbrook does not question the existence of these harms.329 Instead, he writes:
[W]e accept the premises of this legislation. Depictions of subordination tend to perpetuate subordination. The subordinate status
of women in turn leads to affront and lower pay at work, insult and
injury at home, battery and rape on the streets. In the language of
the legislature, “[p]ornography is central in creating and maintaining sex as a basis of discrimination. Pornography is a systematic
practice of exploitation and subordination based on sex which differentially harms women. The bigotry and contempt it produces,
with the acts of aggression it fosters, harm women’s opportunities
for equality and rights [of all kinds].”330
Nevertheless, Easterbrook responds that “this simply demonstrates the power of pornography as speech.”331 Elaborating on this point, he writes:
Bald or subtle, an idea is as powerful as the audience allows it to
be. A belief may be pernicious—the beliefs of Nazis led to the
death of millions, those of the Klan to the repression of millions.
A pernicious belief may prevail. Totalitarian governments today
rule much of the planet, practicing suppression of billions and
spreading dogma that may enslave others. One of the things that
separates our society from theirs is our absolute right to propagate
opinions that the government finds wrong or even hateful.332
326
327
328
329
330
331
332

See supra text accompanying notes 227–34.
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In these passages, Easterbrook expresses a deeply Holmesian view of the First
Amendment. According to Easterbrook, the ordinance in Hudnut in effect distinguishes between two different world views: one that regards women as equal citizens
and one that regards them as “sexual objects” that are subordinate to men.333 The
First Amendment requires the state to remain neutral between these two views. That
position will allow the ideas that have the greatest “power” to prevail, even though
this may result in the subordination and oppression of a large group of people. In this
way, the Holmes-Easterbrook view seems deeply problematic.
This criticism is not meant to imply that the result in Hudnut was necessarily
wrong.334 The issue of pornography is one of the most difficult and controversial in
free speech jurisprudence, and strong arguments have been made on both sides of the
debate.335 For present purposes, there is no need to resolve this dispute.336 Instead, the
point that I wish to make here is that Easterbrook approaches the issue in the wrong
way when he maintains that, for constitutional purposes, it is irrelevant whether pornography causes serious harm to women—a position that reflects the Holmesian view
that the First Amendment protects speech precisely because of its role in a struggle
for power and domination.337
This discussion also points to a broader problem with Holmes’s view. Contrary to
the impression that may be conveyed by the expression “free trade in ideas,”338 Holmes
does not believe that free speech does or should involve an interaction between autonomous subjects. Instead, he sees speech as an activity in which the speaker treats
others as objects. This may involve an effort to dominate them, but it may simply involve an effort to use them to achieve the speakers’ own ends. As we have seen, this
view of speech plays an important role in the Schenck opinion.339 It sheds light on
333

Id. at 325, 328.
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598 F. Supp. 1316, 1337–39 (S.D. Ind. 1984), aff’d on other grounds, 771 F.2d 323 (7th Cir.
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589. Arguments on the other side include RONALD DWORKIN, A MATTER OF PRINCIPLE 335–72
(1985); 2 JOEL FEINBERG, THE MORAL LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL LAW 97–189 (1985); NADINE
STROSSEN, DEFENDING PORNOGRAPHY (1995). For an excellent collection of feminist perspectives on all sides of the debate, see FEMINISM AND PORNOGRAPHY (Drucilla Cornell ed., 2000).
336
In earlier work, I have argued that certain forms of pornography—those that glorify violence against women and that have no serious literary, artistic, scientific, or political value—can
properly be restricted within a liberal humanist framework. See HEYMAN, FREE SPEECH, supra
note 15, at 186–94.
337
See supra text accompanying notes 220–57.
338
Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
339
See supra text accompanying notes 123–25.
334

706

WILLIAM & MARY BILL OF RIGHTS JOURNAL

[Vol. 19:661

Holmes’s example of shouting fire in the theatre, and it also explains his assertion
that the only effect that the circulars could be expected to have was to influence its
recipients to obstruct the draft, without any consideration of their ability to evaluate
the arguments for themselves. These aspects of Schenck reflect his deterministic view
of the world: for Holmes, individuals are not autonomous beings who can direct their
actions in accord with reason, but rather behave in accord with the same laws of cause
and effect that govern other phenomena.340
Holmes does not abandon these views in Abrams, but instead gives them forceful
expression in his Gitlow dissent.341 Responding to the majority’s contention that the
defendant’s revolutionary manifesto was not a mere theory but “an incitement,” Holmes
writes: “Every idea is an incitement. It offers itself for belief and if believed it is acted
on unless some other belief outweighs it or some failure of energy stifles the movement
at its birth.”342 Here again Holmes suggests that speakers effectively cause listeners
to act,343 and in this way treat them as means to the speakers’ own ends. This instrumentalist conception of speech accords with Holmes’s general view that human beings
are not ends in themselves, and that it is perfectly legitimate to treat them as means to
an end, or even—when they stand in one’s way—as “obstacle[s] to be abolished.”344
By contrast, the liberal humanist view understands speech, in the paradigm case, as
an interaction between free and equal persons.
C. Expression That Causes Harm to Others
This discussion leads to the last general objection that I wish to raise to
Holmes’s First Amendment theory: that it unjustifiably allows expressive freedom to
override other fundamental values and to cause serious harm to other individuals and
the community.
According to Holmes, beliefs generally are oriented toward action: they represent
an individual’s or a group’s view of their own good, and inspire them to work toward
the attainment of that good.345 For the most part, the law allows people to express and
act upon their beliefs because that tends to promote social welfare.346 Yet some beliefs
tend to produce actions that cause harm to social interests that the majority desires to
promote by means of law. As we have seen, prior to Abrams, Holmes believed that
340
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the law could properly restrict the expression of such beliefs. On this view, speech
was entitled to no more protection that any other overt act that tended to cause harm.347
Abrams marked a fundamental change in Holmes’s position. Although he continued
to believe that speech was capable of causing harm like any other kind of action, he
took the view that this harm was outweighed by the benefits that flowed from allowing
the free functioning of the marketplace of ideas.348
On this view, freedom of speech essentially consists in a privilege to cause harm.
This idea is consistent with Holmes’s understanding of other privileges. For example,
as he explains in The Common Law, although “the manifest tendency of slanderous
words is to harm the person of whom they are spoken,” the law recognized a privilege
to speak freely in certain situations, such as that of a lawyer making an argument or
a master responding to an inquiry about the character of a former servant.349 In such
cases, “the law considered the damage to the plaintiff of less importance than the
benefit of free speaking.”350 Likewise, an individual is permitted to start a business
that he knows will ruin a competitor—a privilege that “rests on the economic postulate
that free competition is worth more to society than it costs.”351 Holmes’s rationale in
Abrams embraces both of these ideas—it holds that the First Amendment protects
speech that causes harm to other interests on the ground that “free trade in ideas” and
“the competition of the market” will promote the social good.352
In this way, Holmes transforms the First Amendment freedom of speech—which
the framers understood as an inalienable natural right—into a privilege to cause harm.
He conceives of this harm as a loss to social welfare, and, more specifically, as a setback to the particular interests or ideals that the majority would like to promote through
law.353 In Schenck and Debs, Holmes had allowed the government broad latitude to
prevent such harms by imposing restrictions on speech.354 By contrast, in Abrams, he
reinterprets the First Amendment to allow such restrictions only in the most extreme
situations, those in which there is “a clear and imminent danger” of serious harm.355
In Abrams, Holmes hints that a less demanding analysis may be appropriate
“where private rights are . . . concerned.”356 And he later joined a majority opinion
that maintained that the First Amendment does not abolish the common law rules
347
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that impose liability for defamation.357 However, the logic of Holmes’s view would
extend the broad First Amendment privilege to cause harm to cases involving private
rights as well. After all, Holmes does not believe that those rights have any independent foundation. Instead, they are mere “interest[s]” that gain legal protection only
insofar as they advance social welfare,358 and that may and should be “sacrificed without a scruple . . . whenever the interest of society, that is, of the predominant power
in the community, is thought to demand it.”359
For these reasons, the Holmesian view would appear to give broad protection to
speech not only when it causes harm to social welfare, but also when it causes harm
to private rights. And this is especially true of rights such as privacy and reputation.
To use Brandeisian language, these rights are rooted in respect for the “dignity” and
“personality” of individuals360—notions that Holmes rejects.361 Moreover, these rights
serve to protect a person’s inner life or self.362 As we have seen, however, Holmes has
no respect for the inner life as such; instead, he emphasizes the ways in which external
forces shape the natural and social world.363 And this attitude lies at the foundation of
his First Amendment theory, which holds that we protect free speech in order to allow
those social groups and ideas that have the greatest power to prevail in the struggle for
existence. It is difficult to see how rights that are meant to protect inwardness could
stand up against the external forces at work in this process.
In short, the tendency of the Holmesian view is to allow free speech to override
all other values, including the value of protecting individual personality. Some theorists
working in the liberal humanist tradition would not find this problematic, because they
reach the same result by a different route. According to these theorists, the First
Amendment grants absolute protection to expression—a position that they derive from
the demands of individual liberty,364 from the paramount importance of free speech
for democratic self-government,365 or from a complex of such values.366
357
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In earlier work, I have developed an alternative, rights-based version of the liberal
humanist approach.367 According to this view, freedom of speech is a fundamental
right that is based on respect for human dignity and autonomy. But those principles
also give rise to other essential rights. Speech that violates those rights may be regulated through narrowly drawn laws, except in cases where the value of the speech
is so great as to justify the injuries that it causes.368
To determine what rights are sufficiently important to justify limitations on
speech, this view looks to the same principles that support freedom of speech itself.
First, free speech may be understood as a form of external freedom, or the right to control one’s own body without unwarranted interference by others.369 But of course
other individuals have this right as well. At the core of external freedom is personal
security or the right to be free from actual or threatened violence. Immunity from
violence is a right that belongs not only to individuals but also to the community as
a whole, which has both the authority and the responsibility to preserve the peace and
to protect its citizens.370 Speech violates these rights of individuals and the community
when it constitutes an assault or a threat of violence, when it amounts to “fighting
words,” or when it incites its audience to commit violent acts against third parties.371
Second, freedom of speech is protected because of its relationship to individual
autonomy and self-fulfillment. But these values also support other important rights
including reputation, privacy, and emotional tranquillity. Under the rights-based view,
the law should be allowed to protect these rights through some kinds of restrictions on
defamation, invasion of privacy, and intentional infliction of emotional distress.372
A third justification for free speech is the one associated with Brandeis and
Meiklejohn.373 As citizens, individuals are members of a self-governing community
who have both a right and a duty to participate in public discussion on matters of
common concern. Unwarranted restrictions on political speech violate the rights not
only of the affected individuals but also of the community as a whole. At the same
367
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France, and Australia); RONALD J. KROTOSZYNSKI, JR., THE FIRST AMENDMENT IN CROSSCULTURAL PERSPECTIVE 26–27, 93–95, 140–42, 184–85 (2006) (discussing the different
balancing tests employed in Canada, Germany, Japan, and the United Kingdom). International
human rights law takes a similar position. See, e.g., International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights art. 19(3), Dec. 16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171.
369
HEYMAN, FREE SPEECH, supra note 15, at 48.
370
Id. at 50.
371
See id. at 48–51.
372
See id. at 51–59.
373
See supra text accompanying notes 69–76, 288–91.
368
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time, however, democratic principles also support some restrictions on political speech.
For example, in Garrison v. Louisiana,374 Justice William J. Brennan, Jr., explains that
while the First Amendment protects false and defamatory statements about public
officials that are honestly made, “calculated falsehood” should be denied protection
because it is “at odds with the premises of democratic government and with the orderly
manner in which economic, social, or political change is to be effected.”375 For the
same reasons, speech that incites an imminent overthrow of the government falls outside of the broad protection for political speech recognized in Brandenburg v. Ohio.376
Of course, Holmes also would deny First Amendment protection to incitement
that is unprotected by the Brandenburg rule—a rule that closely resembles the position
that he takes in Abrams. Nor is there any reason to believe that he would protect other
forms of speech that promote or threaten imminent violence. It remains true, however,
that the approach that he takes to harmful speech is significantly different from the
rights-based, liberal humanist view that I have just outlined. On that view, speech can
be regulated when it unjustifiably invades other rights that are essential to individual
fulfillment and democratic citizenship. By contrast, Holmes regards those rights as
mere interests that generally are trumped by the constitutional protections for freedom
of speech—a right that he understands as a privilege to cause harm.377
The difference between these two views is well illustrated by the 1989 case of
Florida Star v. B.J.F.378 After she was raped at knifepoint by an unknown assailant,
B.J.F. reported the attack to the county sheriff’s department.379 When the department
posted the crime report in its press room, it inadvertently failed to white out her name
and address.380 This information was subsequently published in the Florida Star.381
B.J.F. and her family then suffered various forms of harassment, including a telephone
call from a man who threatened to rape her again.382 A Florida jury ordered the newspaper to pay her $100,000 in compensatory and punitive damages for recklessly violating a state statute that made it unlawful to publish the name of a sexual assault victim
in any medium of mass communication.383 On appeal, the Supreme Court overturned
the award on First Amendment grounds.384 Writing for a six-to-three majority, Justice
Thurgood Marshall declared that a state could impose liability for the publication of
374

379 U.S. 64 (1964).
Id. at 75.
376
395 U.S. 444 (1969) (per curiam). Brandenburg holds that the state may restrict speech
that advocates unlawful action only where the speech is “directed to inciting or producing
imminent lawless action and is likely to incite or produce such action.” Id. at 447.
377
See supra text accompanying notes 349–63.
378
491 U.S. 524 (1989).
379
Id. at 527.
380
Id. at 546 (White, J., dissenting).
381
Id. at 527 (majority opinion).
382
Id. at 528.
383
Id. at 526, 529.
384
Id. at 532.
375
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truthful, lawfully obtained information on a matter of public concern only if the state
could show that this was necessary to advance state interests of the highest order—a
demanding standard that he found was not satisfied in this case.385
From the standpoint of the liberal humanist, rights-based approach that I have
described, the decision in Florida Star was tragically misguided. On one hand, the
publication of B.J.F.’s name was a gross violation of her rights to privacy and emotional well-being, as well as her right to security against violence. On the other hand,
while the public has a legitimate interest in knowing where and when a particular
crime took place, it has no legitimate interest in knowing the identity of the victim—
at least in a case like Florida Star, in which no one had been arrested or tried for the
crime. Under the rights-based view, then, the newspaper’s action in this case should
be regarded as an unwarranted infringement of B.J.F.’s rights and should not be protected by the First Amendment.
In Florida Star, the majority takes a very different approach: it conceptualizes the
case not as a conflict between two different sets of rights, but rather as a clash between
freedom of speech and social welfare, or what the Court calls “state interest[s].”386 On
this view, values such as individual privacy, personal dignity, and emotional well-being
are mere interests which generally do not warrant limitations on the process of public
discussion—a process that is thought to promote the ultimate good of the society
even though it may result in sacrificing values of vital importance to the individuals
concerned. In these ways, decisions like Florida Star follow the path marked out in
Holmes’s prior First Amendment jurisprudence.387
V. HOLMES AND CONTEMPORARY FIRST AMENDMENT DOCTRINE
In Part IV, I criticized Holmes’s theory of the First Amendment from a liberal
humanist perspective. In this Part, I extend this critique and make it more concrete by
exploring the implications of his thought for several important areas in contemporary
First Amendment doctrine, including the protection of political speech, of private and
artistic expression, and of speech by public employees.
A. Political Speech
For the most part, the Holmesian and liberal humanist views take the same, highly
protective position with regard to political or ideological expression, as one might suppose from the fact that Holmes and Brandeis generally were able to join one another’s
opinions in this sphere.388 Nevertheless, there are at least two important areas in which
these views may diverge: corporate political speech and public hate speech.
385
386
387
388

Id. at 533–41.
Id. at 533.
See supra text accompanying notes 349–63.
See supra text accompanying notes 292–93.
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1. Corporate Political Speech
Last Term, in Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission,389 a deeply divided
Supreme Court struck down a longstanding ban on the use of a corporation’s general
treasury funds to pay for speech supporting or opposing a candidate for federal office.390 At first glance, Justice Anthony M. Kennedy’s majority opinion appears to rest
on liberal humanist principles. According to Kennedy, a corporation is simply an
“association[ ] of citizens” that has the same First Amendment rights as any other
speaker.391 When the government silences a corporation because of its “identity” as
a speaker, the government “commit[s] a constitutional wrong” by depriving the corporation of “the right to use speech to strive to establish worth, standing, and respect
for the speaker’s voice. The Government may not by these means deprive the public
of the right and privilege to determine for itself what speech and speakers are worthy
of consideration.”392 Kennedy further argues that prohibitions on corporate electoral
speech undermine “an essential mechanism of democracy” by interfering with the
“right of citizens”—including those using the corporate form—“to inquire, to hear,
to speak, and to use information to reach consensus,” which is “a precondition to
enlightened self-government and a necessary means to protect it.”393
As Justice John Paul Stevens shows in a powerful dissent,394 these arguments are
deeply flawed. To begin with, corporations are “not natural persons”: they “have no
consciences, no beliefs, no feelings, no thoughts, no desires.”395 Nor does a corporation’s political advertising necessarily express the personal views of its shareholders
or employees, or even of its officers and directors. Thus, the First Amendment value
of individual “self-expression” or “self-realization” is not implicated in this case:
“Take away the ability to use general treasury funds for some of those ads, and no
one’s autonomy, dignity, or political equality has been impinged upon in the least.”396
As for the democratic self-government rationale, Stevens contends that corporations
are not actually “members of our political community.”397 Allowing them to use their
vast aggregations of wealth to “flood the market” for political advertising before an
election endangers rather than promotes democratic deliberation, because it “may

389

130 S. Ct. 876 (2010).
Id. at 913.
391
Id. at 904, 906, 908; see also id. at 928 (Scalia, J., concurring).
392
Id. at 899 (majority opinion).
393
Id. at 898.
394
Id. at 929 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
395
Id. at 947, 972.
396
Id. at 972 (internal quotations marks and citations omitted).
397
Id. at 947; see also id. at 972 (asserting that, although “their ‘personhood’ often serves
as a useful legal fiction,” corporations “are not themselves members of ‘We the People’ by
whom and for whom our Constitution was established”).
390
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decrease the average listener’s exposure to relevant viewpoints, and . . . diminish
citizens’ willingness and capacity to participate in the democratic process.”398
As this exchange suggests, the dispute in Citizens United ultimately turns on
differing understandings of the political process and the marketplace of ideas. The
majority views that process as an arena in which individuals and groups pursue their
own private interests. On this view, there is nothing wrong with using “resources
amassed in the economic marketplace” to obtain “an . . . advantage in the political
marketplace.”399 The First Amendment bars the government from interfering with
the political marketplace by making “judgments about which strengths should be
permitted to contribute to the outcome of an election.”400 By prohibiting corporate
election advertising, the government had “muffle[d] the voices that best represent the
most significant segments of the economy”401 and had thereby “interfere[d] with the
‘open marketplace’ of ideas protected by the First Amendment.”402 In these ways, the
majority opinion seems to rest on an essentially Holmesian view, according to which
the political process and the marketplace of ideas should reflect “the actual equilibrium of force in the community.”403
Stevens responds that the majority’s position would allow corporations to use the
wealth and power that they have obtained in the economic realm to “dominat[e] . . .
the electoral process.”404 “The marketplace of ideas,” he contends, “is not actually
398

Id. at 974–76.
Id. at 904 (majority opinion) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Austin v. Mich.
State Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 659 (1990)); see also id. at 905 (“All speakers,
including individuals and the media, use money amassed from the economic marketplace to
fund their speech.”). By the same token, Kennedy contends that there is nothing wrong with
using one’s wealth to gain “influence over or access to elected officials.” Id. at 910. As he
wrote in an earlier case:
Favoritism and influence are . . . [un]avoidable in representative politics.
It is in the nature of an elected representative to favor certain policies,
and, by necessary corollary, to favor the voters and contributors who support those policies. It is well understood that a substantial and legitimate
reason, if not the only reason, to cast a vote for, or to make a contribution to, one candidate over another is that the candidate will respond by
producing those political outcomes the supporter favors. Democracy is
premised on responsiveness.
Id. at 910 (quoting McConnell v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 540 U.S. 93, 297 (2003) (Kennedy,
J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)).
400
Id. at 904 (quoting Davis v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 128 S. Ct. 2759, 2774 (2008)).
401
Id. at 907 (quoting McConnell, 540 U.S. at 257–58 (opinion of Scalia, J.)); see also id.
at 929 (Scalia, J., concurring) (“[T]o exclude or impede corporate speech is to muzzle the
principal agents of the modern free economy.”).
402
Id. at 906 (majority opinion) (citation omitted).
403
OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, Montesquieu, in COLLECTED LEGAL PAPERS, supra note
97, at 250, 258.
404
Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 977 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
Although Stevens concurred in that part of the majority opinion which upheld the constitutionality of disclosure requirements, he dissented from the rest of the opinion.
399
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a place where items—or laws—are meant to be bought and sold, and when we move
from the realm of economics to the realm of corporate electioneering, there may be no
‘reason to think the market ordering is intrinsically good at all.’”405 Although the dissent also invokes the marketplace of ideas, it reinterprets that image to reflect a more
Meiklejohnian conception of the First Amendment: according to Stevens, restrictions on corporate electoral speech may actually “facilitate First Amendment values
by preserving some breathing room around the electoral ‘marketplace’ of ideas, . . .
the marketplace in which the actual people of this Nation determine how they will
govern themselves.”406
Thus, in Citizens United, the contrast between the Holmesian and the liberal
humanist views emerges in sharp relief. The majority condemns restrictions on corporate speech because they hamper the workings of the marketplace of ideas, an arena in
which the most powerful forces in the society are entitled to prevail.407 The dissenting
Justices do not deny the powerful role that corporate speech can play in the political
process. Indeed, their opinion is the only one to use the term “power” to describe corporate speech.408 Unlike the majority, however, the dissenters are acutely conscious of
the dangers that such power can pose to the values of individual liberty and “republican
self-government” that the First Amendment was meant to promote.409
2. Political Hate Speech
Another issue on which the liberal humanist and Holmesian views may diverge is
that of hate speech, or expression that is intended to abuse or degrade others on the
405
Id. (quoting David A. Strauss, Corruption, Equality, and Campaign Finance Reform,
94 COLUM. L. REV. 1369, 1386 (1994)).
406
Id. at 976 (citations omitted).
407
See supra text accompanying notes 399–403.
408
See Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 953 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part) (explaining that the Tillman Act of 1907 was based on a concern about “the enormous
power corporations had come to wield in federal elections, with the accompanying threat of
both actual corruption and a public perception of corruption”); id. at 971 (contending that the
availability of great resources “may make a corporation a formidable political presence, even
though the power of the corporation may be no reflection of the power of its ideas” (citations
omitted)); id. at 977 (“The Court’s blinkered and aphoristic approach to the First Amendment
may well promote corporate power at the cost of the individual and collective self-expression
the Amendment was meant to serve.”).
409
Id. at 964. The notion that law exists to protect liberty not only against the government
but also against private power did not emerge for the first time in modern progressive thought.
Instead, that notion is deeply rooted in the liberal tradition. See, e.g., LOCKE, GOVERNMENT,
supra note 26, bk. II, § 222, at 412–14 (asserting that laws are made to protect individual
rights and “to limit the Power, and moderate the Dominion of every Part and Member of the
Society”); 3 BLACKSTONE, supra note 23, at *2 (stating that legal institutions are established
“in order to protect the weak from the insults of the stronger”). See generally Steven J.
Heyman, The First Duty of Government: Protection, Liberty and the Fourteenth Amendment,
41 DUKE L.J. 507 (1991).
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basis of characteristics like race, religion, gender, and sexual orientation. It is generally agreed that the state may restrict such speech when it falls within an unprotected
category such as threats or fighting words.410 But a great deal of controversy surrounds the issue whether the state may restrict other forms of hate speech, especially
when they are political or ideological in nature.411
Some liberal theorists have made strong arguments for granting protection to political hate speech. According to these arguments, respect for individual liberty requires
that people be allowed to express their own views and to hear and evaluate the views
of others, no matter how offensive the views in question may be.412 Moreover, it is
said that in a democratic society debate must be open to the views of all, and that the
state would lose legitimacy if it sought to exclude some ideas from public discourse.413
However, it is not clear that political hate speech should receive protection under
the liberal humanist view, for powerful arguments have been made that the protection
of that speech would undermine rather than promote the values on which free expression is based.414 These arguments contend that individuals have no right to pursue
their own self-realization in a way that intentionally interferes with the self-realization
of others.415 Moreover, the right to political free speech is a right to engage in deliberation with other members of the community. Such deliberation is possible only on
the basis of mutual respect.416 Political hate speech attacks the status of its targets as
human beings and members of the community.417 In this way, it not only violates their
right to equal citizenship, but also undermines the ability of the community to engage
in democratic deliberation.418
Considerations like these have led most liberal democratic nations to hold that
some forms of political hate speech fall outside their own constitutional guarantees of
freedom of expression.419 By contrast, American courts generally take the opposite
410

In R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377 (1992), all nine Justices agreed on this point,
although they were sharply divided in other respects. See id. at 382–83 (majority opinion), 399
(White, J., concurring in judgment), 415 (Blackmun, J., concurring in judgment), 416 (Stevens,
J., concurring in judgment).
411
For collections of writings on this issue, see HATE SPEECH AND THE CONSTITUTION, supra
note 317; HENRY LOUIS GATES, JR. ET AL., SPEAKING OF RACE, SPEAKING OF SEX (1994);
MARI J. MATSUDA ET AL., WORDS THAT WOUND: CRITICAL RACE THEORY, ASSAULTIVE
SPEECH, AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT (1993).
412
See, e.g., BAKER, HUMAN LIBERTY, supra note 9, at 86–87; RONALD DWORKIN,
FREEDOM’S LAW: THE MORAL READING OF THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION 200–01, 203–05
(1996).
413
See, e.g., POST, supra note 69, at 303–04, 327.
414
See, e.g., MATSUDA ET AL., supra note 411, at 9 (examining “when hate speech is antithetical to the underlying liberal democratic principles that inform . . . the first amendment”).
415
See HEYMAN, FREE SPEECH, supra note 15, at 166.
416
See id. at 177.
417
See id. at 168–83.
418
See id. at 164–83.
419
See, e.g., S. AFR. CONST., 1996, § 16(2)(c) (stating that freedom of expression does not
extend to “advocacy of hatred that is based on race, ethnicity, gender or religion, and that
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position. The leading case is Collin v. Smith,420 in which the United States Court of
Appeals for the Seventh Circuit held that a neo-Nazi group had a First Amendment
right to march in Skokie, Illinois, a heavily Jewish town that was home to several
thousand Holocaust survivors.421 Although the court conceded that the speech at
issue was “repugnant to the core values” of a civilized society and that it might well
result in “the infliction of psychic trauma” on its targets, the court concluded that
the Nazi speech was “indistinguishable in principle” from other forms of political
speech.422 Similarly, in Virginia v. Black,423 the Supreme Court declared that while the
Constitution does not protect cross-burning that is used to make concrete threats of
violence against others, the burning of a cross to express belief in white supremacy is
a form of “lawful political speech at the core of what the First Amendment is designed
to protect.”424
In this way, the American position on political hate speech has come to be markedly different than that taken by other liberal democracies. Although many explanations can be offered for this difference, one important factor is the legacy of Justice
Holmes for American free speech jurisprudence. The liberal humanist arguments for
regulating hate speech are based on the notion that this speech violates the fundamental rights of its targets, as well as the principles of human dignity and autonomy
on which those rights are founded.425 Holmes rejects those principles and the rights
which flow from them.426 It follows that for Holmes there are no objective normative
grounds on which to distinguish between rightful and wrongful speech. Instead, our
reactions to allegedly wrongful speech are merely subjective, emotional responses. As
Holmes once put it, we “naturally” feel hatred for anything that poses an “obstacle[ ]
constitutes incitement to cause harm”), available at http://www.info.gov.za/documents/
constitution/1996/96cons2.htm#16; R. v. Keegstra, [1990] 3 S.C.R. 697, 701 (Can.) (upholding
a ban on willful promotion of hatred against racial, ethnic, and religious groups); Holocaust
Denial Case, Bundesverfassungsgericht [BverfG] [Federal Constitutional Court] Apr. 13,
1994, 90 Entscheidungen des Bundesverfassungericht [BVerfGE] 241 (Ger.), in DONALD P.
KOMMERS, THE CONSTITUTIONAL JURISPRUDENCE OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY
385 (2d ed. 1997) (upholding the state government of Munich’s imposition of the condition that
the National Democratic Party of Germany not deny the existence of the Holocaust in order to
hold a meeting); Jersild v. Denmark, 19 Eur. Ct. H.R. 1, 16–17 (1994) (indicating that some
restrictions on racist speech are compatible with European Convention on Human Rights).
International human rights conventions take the same position. See, e.g., International Covenant
on Civil and Political Rights art. 20(2), Dec. 16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171, 178 (“Any advocacy
of national, racial or religious hatred that constitutes incitement to discrimination, hostility or
violence shall be prohibited by law.”).
420
578 F.2d 1197 (7th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 916.
421
Id. at 1201.
422
Id. at 1200, 1205–06.
423
538 U.S. 343 (2003).
424
Id. at 365.
425
See, e.g., HEYMAN, FREE SPEECH, supra note 15, at 164–83.
426
See supra text accompanying notes 95–100.
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to our making the kind of world we like.”427 This is what he means when he speaks of
“opinions that we loathe”428 and “the thought that we hate.”429 As he argues in Abrams,
however, the First Amendment does not allow us to restrict speech on these grounds,
but only when necessary to prevent a clear and imminent danger of serious harm.430
From a Holmesian perspective, then, there is no principled distinction between
hate speech and any other form of political expression. Indeed, hate speech does what
he believes all forms of political speech do: it is an effort by one group of people to
assert dominance over another group.431 That is not to say that from a Holmesian
point of view there is nothing wrong with hate speech. Like any other form of speech,
its factual premises should be subjected to critical evaluation.432 In addition, Holmes
believes that, in a civilized society, “the spread of an educated sympathy” ought to
impose some limits on the unbridled pursuit of self-interest and thereby “reduce the
sacrifice of minorities to a minimum.”433 Thus, he might well agree with the Seventh
Circuit that extreme forms of hate speech are “repugnant to the core values” of a civilized society.434 In the end, however, it seems clear that he would say that, under our
political system, advocates of group hatred should be just as free as anyone else to
“fight[ ] to make the kind of a world that [they] should like,”435 and that if their views
“are destined to be accepted by the dominant forces of the community, the only meaning of free speech is that they should be given their chance and have their way.”436 On
this view, political hate speech should receive full protection under the First Amendment. As I have suggested, contemporary American courts generally take the same
position, and it seems likely that this is due in considerable part to the deep influence
that Holmes has had on our free speech jurisprudence.437
427

Letter from Oliver Wendell Holmes to Lewis Einstein (May 21, 1914), in THE ESSENTIAL
HOLMES, supra note 168, at 114, 114.
428
Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
429
United States v. Schwimmer, 279 U.S. 644, 655 (1929) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
430
Abrams, 250 U.S. at 627, 630 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
431
See supra text accompanying notes 215–57.
432
See supra text accompanying notes 190–94.
433
Holmes, Gas-Stokers’ Strike, supra note 173, at 325.
434
Collin v. Smith, 578 F.2d 1197, 1200 (7th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 916; see,
e.g., HOLMES, COMMON LAW, supra note 99, at 37 (observing that, although “[n]o society
has ever admitted that it could not sacrifice individual welfare to its own existence[,] . . . no
civilized government sacrifices the citizen more than it can help”).
435
HOLMES, Natural Law, supra note 98, at 311.
436
Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 673 (1925) (Holmes, J., dissenting). For a criticism
of this position, see ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE MORALITY OF CONSENT 76–77 (1975).
437
The influence of Holmesian thought in this area may be seen in Justice Brennan’s
assertion that “[t]he First Amendment does not guarantee that . . . concepts virtually sacred to
our Nation as a whole—such as the principle that discrimination on the basis of race is odious
and destructive—will go unquestioned in the marketplace of ideas.” Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S.
397, 418 (1989).
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B. Private and Artistic Expression
Although they may part company on a few issues such as corporate electoral
advertising and political hate speech, the Holmesian and liberal humanist views generally come out the same way in cases involving political or ideological expression,
however much their reasoning may differ. The difference between the two approaches
emerges much more sharply in cases involving nonpolitical expression, including
private and artistic expression.
1. Freedom of Speech and Privacy
At the core of the liberal humanist view is a recognition of the inviolability of “the
inward domain of consciousness.”438 Freedom of thought and belief allows individuals
to develop a rich inner life. In this way, there is a close relationship between First
Amendment liberties and the right to privacy. Perhaps the clearest expression of this
relationship can be found in Stanley v. Georgia,439 which holds that the state may not
ban the mere possession of obscene material in an individual’s own home.440 In reaching this conclusion, Justice Marshall invokes the principles of both the First and the
Fourth Amendments, and he quotes the statement in Brandeis’s dissenting opinion
in Olmstead v. United States441—a Fourth Amendment case—that “[t]he makers of
our Constitution . . . sought to protect Americans in their beliefs, their thoughts, their
emotions and their sensations.”442 Marshall continues:
These are the rights that appellant is asserting in the case before us.
He is asserting the right to read or observe what he pleases—the
right to satisfy his intellectual and emotional needs in the privacy
of his own home. . . . If the First Amendment means anything, it
means that a State has no business telling a man, sitting alone in
his own house, what books he may read or what films he may
watch. Our whole constitutional heritage rebels at the thought
of giving government the power to control men’s minds.443
It is difficult to see how Holmes could have reached the same result in a case like
Stanley. Although he too dissented in Olmstead, he declined to join Brandeis’s discussion of the constitutional issues;444 even in a Fourth Amendment case, Holmes was
438
439
440
441
442
443
444

MILL, supra note 77, at 13.
394 U.S. 557 (1969).
Id. at 559.
277 U.S. 438 (1928).
Stanley, 394 U.S. at 564 (quoting Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 478 (Brandeis, J., dissenting)).
Id. at 565.
See Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 469 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
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unwilling to recognize a fundamental right to privacy. As we have seen, this is consistent with his refusal to attribute any special value or importance to the inner lives
of individuals.445 Holmes’s jurisprudence is based on the notion of outward force, not
inward freedom. On this view, the First Amendment does not protect thoughts and
feelings for their own sake, but only insofar as they have an impact on the external
world and help to shape the forces that determine the course of human life.
2. Artistic Expression
For similar reasons, liberal humanism and Holmesianism take very different approaches to the question whether artistic expression is entitled to protection under the
First Amendment. Of course, this issue is an easy one for those forms of liberal humanism that see individual self-expression as a basic value of the First Amendment.446
The problem is more difficult for those forms that focus on the importance of free
speech for democratic self-government or the search for truth. In a well-known 1960
article on free speech and obscenity, Harry Kalven, Jr., questioned whether the theories
of Meiklejohn and Mill could provide a justification for protecting art and literature.447
With regard to Meiklejohn’s view, Kalven observed that “[n]ot all communications are
relevant to the political process. The people do not need novels or dramas or paintings
or poems because they will be called upon to vote.”448
The following year, Meiklejohn responded to this challenge by arguing that the
First Amendment should be understood to protect not only speech that is directly relevant to self-government, but also a broader “range of human communications from
which the voter derives the knowledge, intelligence, sensitivity to human values: the
capacity for sane and objective judgment which, so far as possible, a ballot should
express.”449 According to Meiklejohn, these forms of communication included art and
literature as well as philosophy, science, and education in the broadest sense.450
Likewise, there is no reason to doubt that Mill’s theory would protect artistic
expression. As we have seen, Mill’s argument that free speech is necessary for the
search for truth is integrally connected with his broader view that the highest end for
human beings is to develop their faculties and their individuality.451 This “ideal of
445

See supra text accompanying notes 296–303.
See, e.g., BAKER, HUMAN LIBERTY, supra note 9, at 51–54; REDISH, supra note 68, at
68–76.
447
Harry Kalven, Jr., The Metaphysics of the Law of Obscenity, 1960 SUP. CT. REV. 1, 15–16.
448
Id. at 16.
449
Meiklejohn, Absolute, supra note 69, at 256.
450
Id. at 257. Similarly, Emerson writes that the First Amendment principle that everyone
has a right to participate in decision making “carries beyond the political realm. It embraces the
right to participate in the building of the whole culture, and includes freedom of expression
in religion, literature, art, science, and all areas of human learning and knowledge.” EMERSON,
SYSTEM, supra note 90, at 7.
451
See supra text accompanying notes 84–88.
446
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self-development,” which he identifies with classical Greece,452 has an important
aesthetic dimension. As Mill puts it:
It is not by wearing down into uniformity all that is individual in
themselves, but by cultivating it, and calling it forth, within the
limits imposed by the rights and interests of others, that human
beings become a noble and beautiful object of contemplation;
and as the works partake the character of those who do them, by
the same process human life also becomes rich, diversified, and
animating . . . .453
It is difficult to see how this aesthetic dimension, and the “high thoughts and elevating feelings” that it gives rise to, could be fully captured by rational discourse.454
Instead, it seems clear that on Mill’s view artistic and literary expression are also
necessary to fully express the truth about human life.
In contrast, Holmes denies that art and literature have anything to do with truth,
a domain that he identifies with modern science. As he explains in some remarks
delivered in 1900:
Today the whole domain of truth concerning the visible world belongs to science. . . . We know that the epoch making ideas have
come not from the poets but from the philosophers, the jurists, the
mathematicians, the physicists, the doctors,—from the men who
explain, not from the men who feel. We realize that explanation
and feeling are at the opposite poles of intellectual life, and require and come from opposite interests and opposite gifts. We no
longer ask of belles lettres that they should be a “criticism of life,”
in Matthew Arnold’s phrase, or that they should help us to fix our
attitude toward the world. We do not read novels for improvement
or instruction. . . . [W]e want only to be amused, to be moved, to
be uplifted, and to be charmed.455
In short, for Holmes, the purpose of art is not to pursue or represent “truth,” but merely
“to pull the trigger of an emotion.”456
On this view, art and literature do not seem to contribute anything substantial to
the marketplace of ideas, and so do not fall within the rationale that Holmes articulates
452
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in Abrams. Fortunately, in this area, the Supreme Court has generally followed the
liberal humanist view rather than Holmes’s and has accorded literary and artistic
expression full protection under the First Amendment.457
C. Speech by Public Employees
The final area that I wish to discuss involves speech by public employees. In
McAuliffe v. Mayor of New Bedford,458 Holmes and his colleagues on the Massachusetts
Supreme Judicial Court considered a free speech claim brought by a police officer who
had been fired for engaging in political activity.459 Holmes dismisses the claim with
the observation that “[t]he petitioner may have a constitutional right to talk politics,
but he has no constitutional right to be a policeman.”460 He continues, “There are few
employments for hire in which the servant does not agree to suspend his constitutional rights of free speech as well as of idleness by the implied terms of his contract. The servant cannot complain, as he takes the employment on the terms which
are offered him.”461
In McAuliffe, Holmes treats the “constitutional right[ ] of free speech” as an
ordinary private right which can be waived through contract.462 This position accords
with the rest of his early free speech jurisprudence, which regards freedom of speech
as no different than any other liberty.463 Of course, his view of free speech changes
radically after Abrams, but there is reason to doubt that this would have led him to
completely abandon the position that he takes in McAuliffe. Holmes’s defense of free
speech is based on the idea of power. In Abrams, he conceives of the marketplace of
ideas as a sphere in which the most powerful beliefs will prevail, thus enabling the
dominant forces in the community to formulate and implement their will.464 This leads
him to change his earlier view that the government has broad power to restrict private
expression. But it does not follow that this rationale would prevent the government
from exercising its traditional authority to control its own employees. Instead, the
Holmesian logic of power would seem to favor the government in cases like McAuliffe.
By contrast, the liberal humanist view focuses not on issues of power, but rather
on the question of what rule would best promote the positive values of the First
457
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Amendment, including individual self-expression, the ability of citizens to attain
information about and to debate public issues, and the pursuit of truth. For this
reason, liberal humanists are more inclined than Holmesians to limit the power of
government to restrict public employee speech that serves these values.
Modern free speech jurisprudence has moved a considerable distance away from
the Holmesian position on this issue. In a series of cases, the Supreme Court has rejected the view that the government can condition public employment on the abandonment of one’s right to free speech.465 And in Pickering v. Board of Education,466
the Court ruled that when an employee is disciplined or fired for her speech, a court
must balance “[1] the interests of the [employee], as a citizen, in commenting upon
matters of public concern and [2] the interest of the State, as an employer, in promoting the efficiency of the public services it performs through its employees.”467
Unfortunately, in recent years, the Court has retreated from the relatively protective position that it took in Pickering. In Connick v. Myers,468 a five-to-four majority
ruled that the First Amendment affords no protection to employee speech on matters
that are not of public concern, a term that it defined in an unduly narrow way.469 And
most recently, in Garcetti v. Ceballos,470 another five-to-four majority announced
a categorical rule that speech that falls within an employee’s job responsibilities is
beyond the protection of the First Amendment, no matter how important the speech
may be to the public interest.471 Once again, decisions like this reflect the unfortunate
legacy that Holmes’s thought has had for many aspects of First Amendment doctrine.
CONCLUSION
This Article has explored a paradox that lies at the heart of contemporary First
Amendment jurisprudence. On one hand, the courts assert that the Constitution protects freedom of expression in order to promote basic liberal values such as individual
self-fulfillment, democratic deliberation, and the search for truth. Yet on the other
hand, the courts often accord First Amendment protection to racist hate speech, violent pornography, invasion of privacy, and other kinds of expression that undermine
those fundamental values.
In this Article, I have argued that, to a considerable extent, this Jekyll-and-Hyde
quality is a result of the deep influence that Justice Holmes has had on our First
Amendment tradition. Holmes rejects the traditional view that freedom of speech
is an essential aspect of individual liberty and democratic citizenship. Instead, he
465
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467
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argues in Abrams that the social interest in the attainment of truth is best promoted by
allowing free competition in a marketplace of ideas.472 At first glance, this contention
appears to reflect a strong liberal faith in the capacity of free and open discussion to
discern the truth and thereby to promote the good of the society as a whole. On closer
examination, however, it becomes clear that Holmes adheres to a very different view.
For Holmes, there is no such thing as a common good or an identity of interest within
the society. Instead, human life involves a struggle for existence and power between
different social groups. The Holmesian marketplace of ideas is a mechanism for determining what “the dominant forces of the community” want and how they can best
achieve it.473
I have contended that the Holmesian approach to the First Amendment is fundamentally flawed for several reasons. First, as Holmes himself recognized, the argument that he sketches in Abrams does not provide a convincing rationale for freedom
of speech because it does not satisfactorily explain why the most powerful group
should not simply impose its beliefs through law and “sweep away all opposition.”474
Second, there is no good reason to identify the truth with the views that are accepted
by the dominant group in the society. Third, the Holmesian view equates truth with
power, and thereby allows speech to be used to dominate less powerful groups. On
this view, there is nothing anomalous about extending First Amendment protection to
racist hate speech and other expression that aims to subordinate others: according to
Holmes, that is what all kinds of speech ultimately seek to do. Finally, Holmes understands freedom of speech as a privilege to cause harm, and thus implies that the First
Amendment should protect expression even when it causes serious and unjustified
injury to others.
In all of these ways, the Holmesian view undermines the liberal values that
traditionally have been understood to justify freedom of speech. For this reason I
believe that we should move away from the Holmesian view and more fully adopt a
liberal humanist approach to the First Amendment. Although this would not resolve
all of the difficulties that arise in this area of law, it would focus the inquiry on what
should be the central question: what resolution of a particular controversy would best
promote the principles of human dignity and autonomy that lie at the core of our
constitutional commitment to freedom of expression.
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